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DEATH BY DAUBERT: THE CONTINUED ATTACK ON
PRIVATE ANTITRUST
Christine P. Bartholomewt
In 2011, with five words of dicta, the Supreme Court opened Pandora's
Box for private antitrust enforcement.' By suggesting trial courts must
evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony at class certification, the
Court placed a significant obstacle in the path of antitrust class actions.
Following the Supreme Court's lead, most courts now permit parties to
bring expert challenges far earlier than the traditional summary judgment
or pre-trial timing. Premature rejection of expert testimony dooms budding
private antitrust suits-cases that play an essential role in modern antitrust
enforcement. The dangers for private antitrust plaintiffs are compounded
by the Court's opaque pronouncements on how to assess expert testimony.
Confusion over how to evaluate antitrust economic experts, both
substantively and procedurally, allows courts to use their gatekeeping power
to undermine private antitrust enforcement.
Despite a large body of scholarship on Daubert (the test for expert
admissibility), little has been written on its unique intersection with
antitrust class actions. This Article fills that void by exploring how Daubert
analysis at class certification hamstrings antitrust enforcement. The Article
begins by discussing how judicial evaluation of expert testimony has
evolved, with a particular eye to how courts address antitrust economic
expert testimony at class certification. It then explains why this new barrier
potentially places an impassible, unjustified roadblock in private antitrust
enforcement's path.
t Assistant Professor of Skills, SUNY Buffalo. The author would like to thank Charles
Ewing, Ian Gallager, Chris Pashler, S. Todd Brown, Wayne Bartholomew, John Schlegel, Mark
Bartholomew, Matthew Steilen, Stephen Paskey, and Michael Halberstam for their insightful
feedback and support. Special thanks to my research assistants, Ryan Ganzenmuller and
Anthony Faraco.
1 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011) (commenting on the district
court's conclusion that "Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at the certification stage of
class-action proceedings" with "[w]e doubt that is so").
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INTRODUCTION
Private antitrust class actions are under attack. Through the guise
of judicial gatekeeping, courts have increasingly limited consumers'
ability to seek recourse for anticompetitive conduct.2 Antitrust cases
were already on life support thanks to heightened pleading and
evidentiary hurdles.3 The final nail in the coffin may be a new judicial
2 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (upholding
bar of antitrust class action claims in cases with anti-class action arbitration provisions);
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433-34 (2013) (increasing the rigor of Rule 23
antitrust class certification determinations); Bell AU. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
(increasing the evidence needed for antitrust class actions to survive a motion to dismiss); see
also Joshua D. Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago School of Antitrust: The 2006 Term
and Beyond, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 24, 24 (2007).
3 See infra Part II.A (discussing new gatekeeping hurdles in antitrust class actions); see
also Arthur Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Defamation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 286, 313-14 (2013); E.
Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanishing
2148 [Vol. 35:2147
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barrier: pre-class certification review of expert testimony under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, commonly called Daubert. The Supreme Court
seems determined to decide soon whether such an evaluation is
mandatory.5 For now, focusing on the cryptic phrase "[w]e doubt that is
so," from the Supreme Court's 2011 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
decision,6 lower courts are evaluating whether parties' proffered expert
testimony is admissible before determining whether individual claims
can be aggregated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 237-a marked
departure from prior practice.
On its face, such pre-certification review may not seem that
problematic. Daubert challenges are intended to evaluate whether expert
testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to justify admissibility.8 In
its most innocuous articulation, such a requirement prevents class
certification from being based on potentially unreliable expert
testimony.9 In practice, however, premature Daubert review triggers real
concerns for the future of antitrust. Certification is essential to
consumer enforcement of antitrust laws,10 and economist testimony
plays a critical role in establishing the requirements for class
certification. Individually, the stakes in antitrust suits filed on behalf of
Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1608-10 (2004) (exploring
empirically the impact of Matsushita on summary judgment motions).
4 See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5 The Supreme Court also granted certiorari in two Daubert class certification questions in
both 2012 and 2013. Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted in
part, 133 S. Ct. 24 (2012); In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604 (8th Cir.
2011), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 1752 (2013). However, one case was decided on Rule 23
grounds rather than Rule 702. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426. The other settled before a full briefing.
In re Zurn, 133 S. Ct. at 1752. Hence, Daubert as a prerequisite to certification is not yet black
letter law.
6 Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. The Court reversed class certification based on lack
of commonality, but in passing commented on the Ninth Circuit's affirmation of the district
court's holding that Daubert was not appropriate at class certification by stating, "[w]e doubt
that is so .... " Id.
7 See, e.g., Sher v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. App'x 887, 890 (11th Cir. 2011); Am. Honda Motor
Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552
F.3d 305, 323 (3d Cir. 2008); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), 482
F.3d 372, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2007); see also infra Part I.B (discussing the timing of Daubert in
antitrust class actions and the rise of precertification assessments).
8 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
9 Id.; Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 785 n.302
(1999); Heather P. Scribner, Rigorous Analysis of the Class Certification Expert: The Roles of
Daubert and the Defendant's Proof, 28 REV. LITIG. 71, 106 (2008).
10 William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 'Common Law'
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661, 691 (1982); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Costs
and Benefits of Private and Public Antitrust Enforcement: An American Perspective, in
COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS: ADVANCES IN COMPETITION POLICY ENFORCEMENT IN
THE EU AND NORTH AMERICA 39, 42 (Abel M. Mateus & Teresa Moreira eds., 2010) ("[Tlhe
U.S. antitrust system depends overwhelmingly upon private plaintiffs to police
compliance....").
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consumers are too minimal to support multi-year litigation." As a
result, consumer class actions are the dominant form of private antitrust
enforcement in the United States.12 Federal private antitrust cases
exceed U.S. government actions (civil and criminal) by more than
twenty-five to one.'3 But if a Daubert challenge under Rule 702 is used
to reject economic testimony before class certification, plaintiffs are
powerless to satisfy Rule 23.
By potentially rendering economic experts' testimony inadmissible,
early Daubert review jeopardizes this primary form of antitrust
enforcement. Such a requirement might be of less concern if it was
applied in an evenhanded and consistent manner. But the preliminary
evidence shows otherwise. Courts enjoy tremendous discretion in
evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony.14 This leeway allows
some courts to apply a more relaxed standard while others morph the
expert evaluation into an improperly stringent analysis that wrongly
excludes sufficiently reliable testimony. Without such testimony, class
certification is impossible.15 There is no doubt that the discretionary
nature of Daubert review disproportionately benefits antitrust
defendants: a plaintiffs' expert in private antitrust cases is four times
more likely to be excluded than a defendants' expert.16
11 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) ("A critical fact... is that
petitioner's individual stake... is only $70. No competent attorney would undertake this
complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an amount. Economic reality dictates
that petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or not at all."); J. Douglas Richards, What Makes
an Antitrust Class Action Remedy Successful?: A Tale of Two Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 621,
631 (2005) ("In the context of modern commerce, in which corporate defendants often are
larger and more financially powerful in comparison to the individual consumer than was true
at the time of enactment of the Sherman Act, the only viable procedure for effective private
enforcement of the antitrust laws is the class action." (footnote omitted)).
12 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, ANTITRUST CLASS ACTIONS HANDBOOK 1 (2010)
[hereinafter ABA CLASS ACTIONS HANDBOOK].
13 See AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE'S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 222 (Albert A. Foer ed., 2008).
14 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997) (limiting judicial review of
Daubert decisions to abuse of discretion).
15 See, e.g., Christopher B. Hockett & Frank M. Hinman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony
in Antitrust Cases: Does Daubert Raise a New Barrier for the Entries of Economists?, ANTITRUST,
Summer 1996, at 40, 45.
16 See James Langenfeld & Christopher Alexander, Daubert and Other Gatekeeping
Challenges of Antitrust Experts, ANTITRUST, Summer 2011, at 21, 22; D. Michael Risinger,
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64
ALB. L. REV. 99, 108-10 (2000) (stating nearly 90% of challenges are brought against plaintiffs'
experts). At class certification, exclusion was a bit lower but still disproportionately affected
plaintiffs' experts. Langenfeld & Alexander, supra, at 24-25. The study contributes the lower
exclusion rate at class certification to some courts' application of a modified or lower Daubert
evaluation at class certification during the study period. Id. Given the push for full Daubert
analyses, the exclusion rate will likely continue to rise and match summary judgment levels.
2150 [Vol. 35:2147
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Apart from the private class actions threatened by early Daubert
review, there are few mechanisms to curb anticompetitive acts covered
by antitrust law, such as price fixing, bid rigging, and unlawful
monopolistic conduct. Competitor lawsuits and government
enforcement cannot fill the void. Competitors often have business-
related reasons for hesitating to undertake litigation. Today's rival could
be tomorrow's partner or essential supplier.17 Hence, competitor
antitrust suits form only a nominal portion of the antitrust ecosystem.
Government-side enforcement is an equally limited threat given
the decline of such cases in the last quarter century. 18 Government
enforcement ebbs and flows with an administration's politics19 or ability
to fund such efforts.20 Consequently, at least ninety percent of antitrust
enforcement is addressed through private actions.21 While antitrust
critics are quick to argue these private actions often just tag along with
government enforcement,22 this is more rhetoric than truth. More than
half of antitrust violations are uncovered by private attorneys, not the
government. 23 Further, the amount recovered in private cases is
17 Clare Deffense, Comment, A Farewell to Arms: The Implementation of a Policy-Based
Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble Damages Actions, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 437, 464 (1984).
18 William Kolasky, Antitrust Litigation: What's Changed in Twenty-Five Years?,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2012, at 9.
19 Daniel R. Shulman, A New U.S. Administration and U.S. Antitrust Enforcement, 10
SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 5 (2009); Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in
Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 207, 230 (2003) ("[E]nforcement priorities change from
administration to administration, or with appointment of a new Assistant Attorney General or
FTC chair." Criminal antitrust cases are not much better.).
20 Joseph P. Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing the Antitrust Laws: Too
Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 303, 310-11 (2004); see also Georg
Berrisch, Eve Jordan & Rocio Salvador Roldan, E.U. Competition and Private Actions for
Damages, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 585, 586 (2004) ("[Plublic authorities lack sufficient
resources to investigate and prosecute every single infringement of competition rules.").
21 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE: ANTITRUST CASES FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS BY TYPE OF CASE, 1975-
2006, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412006.pdf; see also Katherine
Holmes, Public Enforcement or Private Enforcement? Enforcement of Competition Law in the EC
and UK, 25 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 25, 25-26 (2004). United States antitrust enforcement is
split between private and governmental actors. Private rights of action for Sherman Act
violations are expressly permitted under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
22 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 223-26 (1983). But see John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 681
n.36 (1986) (questioning prior claims that class action tag along government actions).
23 Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An
Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 879, 880 (2008); see also Stephen Calkins, Coming to
Praise Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006:
ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION OF CARTELS 343, 355-56 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela
Atanasius eds., 2007).
2014] 2151
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significantly higher than from criminal antitrust fines-thus making
private action arguably a stronger deterrent. 24
Once one accepts the necessity of private antitrust enforcement,
early Daubert review represents a potentially existential threat to
antitrust law as a whole. This Article details the nature of that threat,
maintaining that Daubert should not be a prerequisite for certification.
Part I examines the machinery of Daubert review with a particular eye
to its application in antitrust class actions. It documents the trend
towards applying Rule 702 at class certification and describes the critical
role of economist testimony in antitrust class actions. Part II discusses
how early Daubert review invites improper judicial gatekeeping, which
distorts each of the three part Rule 702 analysis. These problems are
only compounded when Daubert is completed prior to a class
certification determination. Part III refutes proponents' proffered
reasons for early Daubert assessments, showing the rationales do not
offset the requirement's harm to antitrust enforcement. Instead of
strangling private antitrust cases in their infancy, Daubert should be
confined to the later stages of litigation where its judicial gatekeeping
function more appropriately applies.
I. DAUBERTREVIEW IN ANTITRUST CLASS ACTIONS
Understanding the danger of adding Daubert as a prerequisite to
certification requires some background on Rule 702 and the role of
economists in antitrust cases. To provide such a foundation, this part
discusses: (1) the role of plaintiffs' expert testimony in private antitrust
cases; (2) the vast discretion given to trial courts in evaluating expert
testimony; and (3) the unprecedented early timing of Daubert review.
A. Economic Testimony in Antitrust Class Actions
Adding Daubert to class certification in antitrust class actions
imports the present confusion over its application into an already
complicated, nuanced area of law. In all antitrust cases, economist
testimony can help with evaluating antitrust impact and damages.2 5 But
24 Lande & Davis, supra note 23, at 893, 895 (detailing how criminal antitrust actions since
1990 resulted in $4.232 billion, while private actions generated $18.006 billion of damages).
25 See generally Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony Trends in Federal Practice, SM060 ALI-
ABA 551, 559 (2007); Christopher K. Kay, Effective Rules for Effective Economic Testimony at
Trial, AHLA-PAPERS P02170011 (2000) (discussing the role of economists in antitrust cases).
2152 [Vol. 35:2147
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in class actions, economists also opine on predominance, a requirement
for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).26
To prove predominance, plaintiffs rely heavily on economists to
establish that the stated claims are sufficiently homogenous.27 Questions
of law and fact common to class members must predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members.28 Generally, courts find
predominance if common evidence establishes: (1) an antitrust
violation; (2) common impact, meaning class members suffered some
recognized antitrust injury as a result of the anticompetitive conduct;
and (3) a reasonable estimation of damages suffered by class members.29
Plaintiffs' experts have a harder job at class certification than
defendants' experts. To prove predominance under Rule 23(b)(3), the
plaintiffs' economist must propose an econometric method to establish
that anticompetitive impact and damages can be evaluated on a class-
wide basis.30
At class certification, the economist need only proffer models, not
completed studies using these models. He starts by looking at the
evidence produced during class certification discovery, looking for
industry information to evaluate the relevant product and geographic
markets.31 This evidence is the product of hard-fought battles with the
defendants regarding what data allegedly exist yet can be produced and
shared with an expert. Unless a great deal of public information is
26 Most private antitrust class actions request monetary relief, not just injunctive relief.
ABA CLASS ACTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 174. Accordingly, plaintiffs must satisfy
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3). While defendant classes exist, they are uncommon since defendants
are rarely willing to concede a conspiracy, and generally defend by denying participation. See
Rios v. Marshall, 100 F.R.D. 395, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Hence, this Article focuses solely on
plaintiffs' classes.
27 Predominance looks at "whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation." In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 266 (3d Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cohesion ensures proceeding as a class is efficient,
and results in promoting uniform decisions. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's
notes.
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs also must show class actions are a superior way of
resolving the dispute. Id.
29 See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2008);
Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2008); Bell Ad. Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302-04 (5th Cir. 2003).
30 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ECONOMETRICS: LEGAL, PRACTICAL, AND
TECHNICAL ISSUES 197-201 (2005) [hereinafter ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST ECONOMETRICS];
Hal J. Singer, Economic Evidence of Common Impact for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases: A
Two-Step Analysis, ANTITRUST, Summer 2011, at 34; see also, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (regression model for evaluating damages for
exclusionary conduct); In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 560 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(regression model to calculate customer overpayment).
31 Paul A. Johnson, The Economics of Common Impact in Antitrust Class Certification, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 533, 537 (2011) (discussing how economists should qualitatively review
allegations and evidence to identify potentially significant economic factors).
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available, the data are often less than ideal. For example, they may not
be fully complete; they may be from a different time period; or they may
not include all pricing components. 32 So at class certification, the
plaintiffs' expert must develop not a perfect model, but the best model
possible under the circumstances.33
From there, a plaintiffs' expert sees if some common pricing
structure applies to the class. If price impact is quantified, the class-wide
impact can be comparatively established.34 Sometimes experts turn to
price lists or statistical correlations.35 When the market is too complex
to argue for a uniform pricing structure, experts use regression
analyses.36 These regression models rely on transaction-level data to
identify the relevant determinants of price.37 These models are used to
argue that all the relevant pricing information needed to establish
impact and damages can be quantified using common evidence, thus
establishing predominance. However, how to run these models and
what variables must be included are often fact-specific, hotly-contested
questions-even among economists.38
In contrast, the defendants' role tends to be a far easier one, as they
generally attack these models in one of two ways. They point out flaws
in the plaintiffs' expert testimony and/or advance their own model to
argue there are too many individualized issues.39 Rather than coming up
32 See John L. Solow & Daniel Fletcher, Doing Good Economics in the Courtroom: Thoughts
on Daubert and Expert Testimony in Antitrust, 31 J. CORP. L. 489, 495-96 (2006).
33 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2007 WL 3245438, at *2 (E.D.
La. Nov. 1, 2007); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 18, 27-29 (N.D. Ga.
1997).
34 See, e.g., John H. Johnson & Gregory K. Leonard, In the Eye of the Beholder: Price
Structure as Junk Science in Antitrust Class Certification Proceedings, ANTITRUST, Summer
2008, at 108, 109 (describing price structure arguments advanced to establish common impact).
35 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST ECONOMETRICS, supra note 30, at 220-24 (2005); see also,
e.g., In re Screws Antitrust Litig., 91 F.R.D. 52 (D. Mass. 1981).
36 Michelle M. Burtis & Darwin V. Neher, Correlation and Regression Analysis in Antitrust
Class Certification, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 498 (2011); see also Daniel I. Rubenfeld, Reference
Guide on Multiple Regression, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 179 (2d ed. 2000).
37 Roy J. Epstein, An Econometrics Primer for Lawyers, ANTITRUST, Summer 2011, at 29, 32.
As the rigor of Rule 23 increases, plaintiffs' economists advance more nuanced means of
establishing common impact, particularly when the anticompetitive conduct alleged occurred
in markets with complicated distribution methods, non-homogenous products, or price
dispersion. See, e.g., In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 253 F.R.D. 478, 505 (N.D.
Cal. 2008); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 472, 486 (W.D. Pa. 1999); Burtis &
Neher, supra note 36, at 502-03.
38 Compare John C. Beyer, The Role of Economics in Class Certification and Class- Wide
Impact, in LITIGATING CONSPIRACY: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION CLASS ACTIONS 325
(Stephen G.A. Pitel ed., 2006) (discussing a list of facts that help support a conclusion of
common impact), with John H. Johnson & Gregory K. Leonard, Economics and the Rigorous
Analysis of Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 3 COMPETITION L. & ECON. 341, 345 (2007)
(arguing against "prototypical plaintiffs' arguments" to establish common impact).
39 See, e.g., In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 615 (8th Cir. 2011); In
[Vol. 35:21472154
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with a methodology to provide clarity to the chaos, as plaintiffs must,
the defendants can just pick apart the expert report by pointing out
some aspect of pricing that, when considered, allegedly precludes
predominance.40 Thus, economic testimony, while helpful, is not as
essential to the defendants' case. 41
Generally the plaintiffs' expert responds that his model is still
reliable. His reasons often fall within four categories: (1) there is
something special about the market; (2) there is something special about
the model; (3) the particular aspect of pricing was actually considered;
and/or (4) data for that variable do not exist.42 Arguments about the
sufficiency of an expert's testimony are appropriate under Rule 23. This
is in contrast to Daubert challenges, which focus on the more general
expert admissibility questions. The standard for expert admissibility is
discussed next.
B. Evaluating Expert Testimony
The modern approach to evaluating expert testimony began in
1993.43 Previously, only expert testimony that was generally accepted in
the field was admissible.44 Daubert sought to liberalize the admissibility
standard,45 thus allowing more expert testimony than before. Under this
new, more liberal standard, even "shaky" expert testimony is
admissible.46 Rather than seeking to exclude the testimony, the parties
should rely on the traditional screens of "[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden
of proof."47 To provide some limit, though, expert testimony must be
re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 314 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Live Concert
Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 98, 126 (C.D. Cal. 2007); In re S.D. Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 657
N.W.2d 668, 677 (S.D. 2003).
40 In re Ready-Mixed Concrete Antitrust Litig., 261 F.R.D. 154, 165 (S.D. Ind. 2009); see
also Solow & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 496 ("[D]efendants' experts are entirely capable of
ignoring inconvenient facts, producing economic models that do not fit the case at hand, and
manipulating statistical results.").
41 Langenfeld & Alexander, supra note 16, at 21.
42 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2001); In re
TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-1827, 2012 WL 555090, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21,
2012); In re Aftermarket Auto. Lighting Prods. Antitrust Litig., 276 F.R.D. 364, 372 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
43 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583 (1993).
44 See id. at 587-89.
45 Id. at 595-97; see also Anthony Z. Roisman, The Courts, Daubert, and Environmental
Torts: Gatekeepers or Auditors?, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 552 (1997) ("Subsequent decisions
by various circuit courts have confirmed that the effect of the Daubert decision was to liberalize
the admissibility of evidence, not restrict it.").
46 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
47 Id.
2014] 2155
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
relevant and reliable48 to protect jurors from relying on junk science and
to avoid trial courts admitting all expert testimony wholesale.49
The Supreme Court shaped the current iteration of Daubert
through a series of decisions aimed at broadening the test's scope and
breadth. The test is not articulated in a single case but rather a series of
related cases and a statutory amendment that collectively form the
current contours of expert evaluation.50 This jurisprudence clarified
Daubert applies to all expert testimony, including economists' testimony
in private antitrust suits. '
Unlike Rule 23(b)(3)'s focus on predominance of common issues,
Daubert considers the more basic questions of reliability and relevancy.
The amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in 2000 echoes these
concepts. 52 Rule 702 states expert testimony is admissible so long as: (1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 53
Under the first two prongs, courts consider several optional factors,
48 Id. at 589.
49 United States v. Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 2009); Margaret Bull Kovera, Melissa
B. Russano & Bradley D. McAuliff, Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology Underlying
Daubert: Legal Decision Makers' Abilities to Evaluate Evidence in Hostile Work Environmental
Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 180 (2002); see also Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32
GA. L. REV. 699, 704 (1998) (arguing Daubert gives a "mixed message" that is "schizophrenic"
by simultaneously recognizing both the need for liberality and the need for limitations); G.
Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29
CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 951-53 (1996) (arguing Daubert creates a dilemma because it
simultaneously loosens and tightens the standard for admissibility).
50 The four primary Supreme Court decisions are: Weisgram v. Marley, 528 U.S. 440
(2000); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997); and Daubert, 409 U.S. 579. The three later cases provided opportunities to clarify
the post-Daubert confusion. While the Court elaborated on some of Daubert's unanswered
questions in Kumho, Joiner, and Weisgram, it also added new posts to judicial gatekeeping
without first securing the existing ones. Thus, how to evaluate expert testimony in light of these
cases remains highly controversial. See generally David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution
and the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 893,911-14 (2013).
51 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 149. Kumho is not without its critics. Daubert placed
particular emphasis on the rule of scientific testing in evaluating reliability. Daubert, 509 U.S. at
593. Yet, by expanding Daubert beyond scientific experts, lower courts are left with little
guidance on whether this aspect of "testability" is relevant to determining the admissibility of
evidence.
52 Rule 702 did not technically codify Daubert. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note
("No attempt has been made to 'codify' [Daubert's] specific factors.").
53 Id.
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including whether the expert's methodology is testable54 and subject to
peer review.55
The third prong, "application," is slightly different. This concept,
often described as an "analytical fit," considers whether an expert's
proposed theory fits the facts of the case. Fit is defined generously.56 The
Supreme Court first described fit through a hypothetical involving
expert testimony regarding phases of the moon. The Court explained
that such testimony would help a juror determine whether a certain
night was dark, assuming darkness was a question of fact in the case.57
Because the testimony is legally relevant and assists the trier of fact, the
expert testimony sufficiently "fits" the case and thus is admissible.
Rather than provide concrete guidance, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the flexibility afforded trial courts in assessing
expert testimony.58 The trial court's broad latitude is affirmed by the
generous abuse of discretion standard of review given such decisions.59
An appellate court may overturn a trial court's decision only if the trial
court "acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles" or
"act[ed] arbitrar[ily] or unreasonabl[y]."60 This limited judicial review
means parties on the losing side of a Daubert evaluation are not given an
opportunity to cure on remand, even when expert testimony is essential
to the case, as is often true in antitrust class actions.61
This discretion has resulted in significant judicial inconsistency.
Despite several opportunities to spell out an expert admissibility
standard, subsequent Supreme Court Daubert cases more frequently
54 Id. "Testable" in this context means the expert's theory can be challenged in some
objective sense, rather than just being a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably
be assessed for reliability.
55 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
56 The Supreme Court explained the concept by reference to United States v. Downing.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-95 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.
1985)). There, the defendant's expert sought to testify regarding cross-racial identification
issues, though the case did not involve any such identification. Accordingly, the expert
testimony was excluded. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242.
57 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-95.
58 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152-53 (1999) (discussing judicial
flexibility in expert evaluations); United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 322 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
59 Previously, such rulings were subject to a stricter de novo standard. See Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) ("But Daubert did not address the standard of appellate review
for evidentiary rulings at all.").
60 See, e.g., Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).
61 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2000). Exclusion of an expert under
Daubert, even when outcome-determinative, would not be subject to a more searching
appellate review. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152; Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir.
2010); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 556 (11th Cir. 1998); Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
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muddied rather than clarified the test. This has left courts sharply
divided on basic aspects of Rule 702.
For example, in evaluating sufficiency and reliability, whether the
Daubert factors are even applicable "is a matter that the law grants the
trial judge broad latitude to determine."62 Consequently, which factors
count varies from judge to judge.63 As Professor Faigman describes, "the
ultimate question is whether the expert testimony is based on good
grounds. But what grounds qualify as good is something of a moving
target."64 As a result, some courts rely on factors poorly suited for
economist testimony, as discussed in Part 11.65
Second, courts differ as to whether Rule 702's sufficiency
evaluation allows judges to weigh competing expert testimony. When
opposing experts clash, some courts resolve the battle by deeming one
unreliable rather than leaving such determinations to the trier of fact.66
Others view such weighing of expert testimony as beyond the scope of
judicial gatekeeping.67
Third, in evaluating application, the degree of fit necessary varies
widely by court. Some contend the fit standard is "not that high,"68
while others require a degree of precision unrealistic for economic
analyses.69 Thus, whether an economist's testimony is admitted depends
heavily on which judge is evaluating it.
As discussed later, judicial discretion gives courts free reign to
apply Daubert in an overly rigorous way at odds with its liberalizing
intent. Instead of permitting potentially reliable expert testimony, it
screens out plaintiffs' experts disproportionately. Despite these
62 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152-53. This same lack of guidance is echoed in Rule 702's
amendment, where Congress stated its absence of Daubert factors was intentionally aimed at
giving trial courts flexibility in evaluating experts. FED R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
63 Some courts go as far as to forego the factors altogether. See, e.g., Jacobs v. N. King
Shipping Co., No. 97-772, 1998 WL 28234, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 1998) (not applying any of
the Daubert factors but rather evaluating expert testimony to determine if it is aligned with
Daubert's overall goal); see also Patrica A. Krebs & Bryan J. De Tray, Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael: A Flexible Approach to Analyzing Expert Testimony Under Daubert, 34 TORT &
INS. L.J. 989, 995 (1999) (arguing a court must consider the expert's qualifications in the
particular area he is testifying).
64 Faigman, supra note 50, at 918.
65 See infra Part II.B.1.
66 Stephen Mahle, Daubert and Commercial Litigation Expert Testimony, in THE FLORIDA
BAR, BUSINESS LITIGATION IN FLORIDA ch. 13 (2007).
67 See, e.g., In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. 00-MDL-1328(PAM), 2003
WL 244729, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2003) (discussing how Daubert was not intended to be a
battle of the experts).
68 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Kordek v.
Becton, Dickinson and Co., 921 F. Supp. 2d 422, 427-29 (E.D. Pa. 2013); In re Flonase Antitrust
Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Safeco Ins. Co. v. S & T Bank, No. 07-01086,
2010 WL 786257, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010).
69 See infra Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes.
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problems, Daubert opened the floodgates for challenges to expert
testimony. From 2000-2009 alone expert challenges rose over 340%.70
Now, this trend is catching a second wind, with courts increasingly
seeing Rule 702 motions earlier in antitrust class actions, particularly
before Rule 23 rulings. This trend is discussed next.
C. Timing of Daubert Assessments in Antitrust Class Actions
Evaluating expert testimony at class certification is a marked
change of course for antitrust class actions. Prior to Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
many courts outright rejected motions to exclude experts at class
certification,71 instead focusing their analysis on the testimony's role in
satisfying Rule 23.72 These cases demonstrated a cogent understanding
of the limited purpose of Daubert, although their rationales for denying
the motions varied. Some courts pointed to the early procedural posture
of class certification determinations:73 plaintiffs' expert need only
propose a methodology, not actually complete the model at class
certification, making it premature to evaluate the testimony for
admissibility.74 Other courts were wary of making unnecessary merit-
based determinations at class certification.75
70 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, DAUBERT CHALLENGES TO FINANCIAL EXPERTS: A TEN-
YEAR STUDY OF TRENDS AND OUTCOMES 2002-2009 (2010), available at
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/assets/2009-Daubert-study.pdf.
71 See, e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 18, 26 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
72 In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 267 F.R.D. 549, 556 (D. Minn. 2010), affd
644 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2011) ("Several district courts in the Eighth Circuit have declined to
engage in a full Daubert analysis at the class certification stage, considering only whether the
expert testimony is helpful in determining whether the requisites of class certification have
been met."); see also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 635 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("At
this early stage, robust gatekeeping of expert evidence is not required; rather, the court should
ask only if expert evidence is useful in evaluating whether class certification requirements have
been met." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), affd in part, vacated in part,
657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011).
73 See, e.g., Drayton v. W. Auto Supply Co., No. 01-10415, 2002 WL 32508918, at *6 (11th
Cir. Mar. 11, 2002); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir.
2001), overruled on other grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir.
2006), and superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Attenborough v. Constr. & Gen.
Bldg. Laborers' Local 79, 238 F.R.D. 82, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (recognizing Daubert motions are
typically not made until summary judgment or trial); In re Netbank, Inc., Sec. Litig., 259 F.R.D.
656, 670 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
74 In re Polypropylene Carpet, 996 F. Supp. at 26 n.6.
75 See, e.g., Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983); LaBauve v.
Olin Corp., 231 F.R.D. 632, 644 (S.D. Ala. 2005); O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D.
311, 321 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292
(2d Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v.
Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2008); Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers v. Newport
Adhesives & Composites, 209 F.R.D. 159, 162-63 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly make Daubert a pre-
requisite to certification, but it tipped its hand towards supporting such
a requirement in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.76 In the trial court, Wal-Mart's
motion to exclude plaintiffs' expert testimony under Daubert was
denied.77 Wal-Mart appealed this ruling and the subsequent class
certification determination.78 The Ninth Circuit rejected the challenge
as an improper merits inquiry, but its reasoning only added confusion
to the Daubert issue. The Ninth Circuit stated: "[a]t the class
certification stage, it is enough that [plaintiffs' expert] presented
scientifically reliable evidence tending to show that a common question
of fact-i.e., 'Does Wal-Mart's policy of decentralized, subjective
employment decision making operate to discriminate against female
employees?'-exists with respect to all members of the class."79 This
language repeats key Daubert-esque terms like scientific reliability, but
instead suggests that inquiry is already part of the Rule 23 analysis-
beginning a trend of conflating Rule 23 and Daubert.80
On appeal, the specific issue was whether plaintiffs met Rule
23(a)(2)'s "commonality" requirement.81 The Supreme Court did not
squarely address the Ninth Circuit's Daubert ruling beyond noting the
appellate court ruled that Daubert at class certification was
inappropriate. 82 The Supreme Court's response: "[w]e doubt that is
so.. .. "83 Many scholars and practitioners have subsequently relied on
these five words of dicta to justify full-blown Daubert evaluations at
class certification.84
Despite legitimate concerns about earlier Rule 702 rulings, post-
Dukes the prevailing trend is to assess the expert testimony's reliability.85
76 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (2011).
77 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 602-03 (9th Cir. 2010), judgment reversed,
131 S. Ct. 2541.
78 Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2549-50.
79 Dukes, 603 F.3d at 603.
80 See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
81 Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-51.
82 Id. at 2554.
83 Id. The Supreme Court also granted certiorari to two cases involving Daubert evaluations
before class certifications. However, both cases were resolved without clarifying the timing for
Rule 702. See supra note 5 (discussing Behrend and Zurn Pex Plumbing).
84 See, e.g., Zachary W. Biesanz & Thomas H. Burt, Everything that Requires Discovery Must
Converge: A Counterintuitive Solution to a Class Action Paradox, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 55, 68
(2012); John M. Husband & Bradford J. Williams, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Redux: The Future of the
Sprawling Class Action, 40 COLO. LAW. 53, 55 (2011); Meredith M. Price, The Proper
Application of Daubert to Expert Testimony in Class Certification, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1349, 1355 (2012); Julie Slater, Reaping the Benefits of Class Certification: How and When
Should "Significant Proof" Be Required Post-Dukes?, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1259, 1274-75.
85 See, e.g., Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010); In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 323 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Aftermarket Auto.
Lighting Prods. Antitrust Litig., 276 F.R.D. 364, 370-71 (C.D. Cal. 2011). While this Article
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Most courts engage in a full or nearly full Daubert assessment at
certification. 86 The Seventh Circuit was the first circuit court to mandate
this new hurdle.87 Soon after, other circuits followed suit. The First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh, and portions of the Ninth
Circuit adopt a similar requirement.88 However, the nature of these
Daubert assessments differs among the courts. Some reflect a broad-
brush form,89 with the court applying Daubert more as a guidepost than
as an exclusionary assessment. 90 Other judges use a full Daubert test as a
barrier to class certification. Rather than applying Daubert as it was
originally intended, these courts improperly assert judicial gatekeeping
and use Rule 702 to exclude reliable economic testimony.91
In these courts, an early Daubert exclusion can make or break an
antitrust case. Historically, certain types of anticompetitive wrongdoing
were viewed as per se harmful, meaning plaintiffs could pursue antitrust
claims without proving anticompetitive impact. As the categories of per
focuses primarily on federal antitrust class actions, state courts are also conflicted on when to
apply Daubert. Compare Howe v. Microsoft Corp., 656 N.W.2d 285, 295 (N.D. 2003) (refusing
to complete Daubert during certification), with In re S.D. Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 657
N.W.2d 668, 675 (S.D. 2003) (applying a modified Daubert test at class certification).
86 Only the Eighth Circuit has expressly rejected requiring a full Daubert assessment at class
certification. See In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 611 (8th Cir. 2011).
There, the defendant appealed the Eighth Circuit's approach of using a tailored Daubert
analysis, which looks at the reliability of the expert testimony in terms of class certification
criteria, recognizing the limited evidence available at that stage of litigation. Id. at 614. This
modified approach was intended to temper Dukes with the challenges of completing Daubert
early in a complex litigation case. Id. at 612 & n.5. In actuality, though, this tailored Daubert
test does little to assess an expert or avoid improper gatekeeping, as the contours of this
modified approach are not spelled out. Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and
Legal Strategy, 2010-11 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 319, 352-53 n.160. The parties settled the appeal
before a full briefing before the Supreme Court. Zurn Pex Plumbing, 133 S. Ct. at 1752.
87 Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2012); Am.
Honda Motor Co., 600 F.3d at 815-16.
88 See, e.g., Sher v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. App'x 887, 890 (11th Cir. 2011); In re Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d. at 316-20; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), 482
F.3d 372, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.
2005); Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 280 F.R.D. 665, 670 (S.D. Fla. 2012); In re Intel
Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 05-1717, 2010 WL 8591815, at *15 (D. Del.
July 28, 2010); In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 55, 65-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The
Ninth Circuit is still unsettled on the question, with at least some courts requiring a Rule 702
analysis precertification. Compare Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 281 F.R.D. 534, 541, 547
(C.D. Cal. 2012) (applying a full Daubert inquiry), with Pryor v. Aerotek Scientific, LLC, 278
F.R.D. 516, 534 n.63 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (declining to utilize Daubert).
89 See, e.g., In re S.D. Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 657 N.W.2d 668, 675 (S.D. 2003) (applying
a lower Daubert standard to determine whether the expert's testimony rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand).
90 Id. Some courts that initially adopted a hard-line "full-blown" Daubert position post-
Dukes have been trending towards this moderate position. See, e.g., Bruce v. Harley-Davidson
Motor Co., No. CV 09-6588, 2012 WL 769604, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) (arguing for a
tailored Daubert analysis at class certification on a strained argument that the Ninth Circuit
required Daubert but never mandated it be a full-blown Daubert analysis).
91 See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
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se anticompetitive violations diminished, the need for economist
testimony increased.92 While antitrust class actions have involved
economic testimony for several decades, economists are increasingly
vital to class certification.93 Hence, an additional forum for challenging
economic testimony has serious implications to antitrust enforcement.
This is particularly true when, as described below, this new forum is ill-
suited for evaluating competing economists. The next Part details how
early Daubert review allows some courts to distort their gatekeeping
power, in turn hindering antitrust enforcement.
II. THE PARTICULAR DANGERS OF APPLYING DAUBERTAT CLASS
CERTIFICATION
Given the key role economist testimony plays in antitrust class
actions, screening such testimony is warranted. Judicial resources are far
from absolute, and judicial gatekeeping is a necessary tool to balance
access and efficiency.94 As a point of clarification, this Article does not
take issue with applying Daubert pre-trial or once an expert's final
report is complete, such as at the close of merits discovery. The
arguments for and against those gates are already well fleshed out. 95 The
analysis here focuses on how an additional Daubert hurdle improperly
hinders private antitrust enforcement. Should the Supreme Court or
Congress act to clarify and spell out a test that does not
disproportionately harm one side's experts, perhaps earlier Daubert
assessments could be considered. Until such time, though, this new
obstacle should not be added given the harm it poses to antitrust
enforcement.
92 See Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic
Consensus in the Battle of the Experts, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1261, 1271 (2012) (attributing the
increased reliance on expert testimony to more rule of reason determinations and increased
emphasis on structure and performance, rather than misconduct).
93 See Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 309, 318-19
(2002) (discussing survey finding eighty percent of antitrust actions involve expert testimony);
accord 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 309 (2d ed. 2000)
(noting that "economic testimony is both ubiquitous and essential in antitrust cases").
94 Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1218
(2008).
95 Compare Andrew I. Gavil, Defining Reliable Forensic Economics in the Post-
Daubert/Kumho Tire Era: Case Studies from Antitrust, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 877 (2000),
with Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, The Implications of Daubert for Economic
Evidence in Antitrust Cases, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 801, 830 (2000) (discussing the benefits of
Daubert at summary judgment).
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This Part explores why requiring Daubert before class certification
invites courts to overreach and exclude potentially reliable expert
testimony at the expense of private antitrust enforcement. First,
confusion over how to apply Daubert to economists allows some courts
to misconstrue Rule 702, consequently misapplying their gatekeeper
power. Second, starting with Rule 702 makes it more difficult to certify
an antitrust class action-a result never intended by Daubert.
A. Misconstruction of Rule 702 Hinders Enforcement
Adding Daubert as a prerequisite to class certification invites
improper judicial gatekeeping. Because it permits judges to limit which
claims receive judicial access, gatekeeping power should be narrowly
prescribed.96 Even without Daubert, judicial gatekeeping remains alive
and well in private antitrust cases, as Rule 23 serves as a strong filter for
weak expert testimony. Thus, it is necessary to consider whether an
additional layer of gatekeeping is warranted, particularly when it
disproportionately impacts one party.
Rather than helping to screen out unreliable expert testimony,
applying Daubert as a prerequisite to class certification creates a myriad
of problems not fully analyzed by the courts or pro-Daubert advocates.
Overly permissive judicial discretion has allowed some courts to
misapply Rule 702's sufficiency, reliability, and analytical fit
requirements. While Rule 702 is poorly suited for antitrust expert
testimony,97 this misfit is amplified in three ways when applied pre-class
certification. First, courts inflate Rule 702's sufficiency requirement,
converting an admissibility test into an invitation to weigh competing
expert testimony. Using Daubert to pick a victor in a battle of
economists is an improper expansion of judicial gatekeeping. Second,
some courts focus on particular Daubert factors which are ill-suited for
economic testimony. This makes Daubert a faulty screen for assessing
reliability. Third, in analyzing the application of the expert's
methodology to the facts, courts adopt overly rigorous interpretations of
analytical fit. This misconstruction encourages judges to move from
gatekeepers to fact-finders, essentially denying the parties their right to a
jury trial.
96 See Erin B. Kaheny, The Nature of Circuit Court Gatekeeping Decisions, 44 LAW & SoC'Y
REV. 129, 130 (2010).
97 5 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 46:5 (2013-14 ed.). This misfit was part of the reason
some judges assumed Daubert did not apply to such testimony before Kumho. See, e.g.,
Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997); Compton v. Subaru of Am.,
Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996); lacobelli Const., Inc. v. Cnty. of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19
(2d Cir. 1994).
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1. Sufficiency Does Not Require a Battle of the Experts
Rather than focusing on whether an economist's testimony is based
on sufficient facts, some courts are using their gatekeeping power to
justify weighing competing expert testimony.98 This turns Daubert into
a battle of the experts. 99 These courts rewrite Rule 702's sufficiency
requirement to decide which expert is more convincing00 This
approach is a notable departure from Rule 702: sufficiency is about
whether the testimony is based on sufficient facts, not about crowning
one expert at the expense of another. As one scholar artfully describes,
the modern Daubert challenge has become "a case of 'my expert is better
than your expert; therefore, your expert should be excluded."' 101
At class certification, it is particularly problematic to use Daubert
for expert selection. When Daubert is applied at this stage, Rule 702's
reliability prong is often commingled with Rule 23's predominance
determination.102 This infuses the Daubert analysis with judicial
confusion surrounding Rule 23.103 In the last few years, some Supreme
Court language implicitly blessed using class certification as a
98 In fact, this is essentially the argument advanced by defendants in Comcast. Rather than
focusing on whether the plaintiffs' expert's methodology was appropriate for an economist,
they instead sought to have the trial court decide whether plaintiff or defendant's geographic
market definition is "right." Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5-8, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133
S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (No. 11-864), 2012 WL 5280782.
99 In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. CIV.00-MDL-1328(PAM), 2003 WL
244729, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2003) (discussing how Daubert was not intended to be a "battle
of the experts."). But see L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Comment, Between "Merit Inquiry" and
"Rigorous Analysis". Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action
Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1041 (2004) (questioning In re Monosodium Glutamate).
100 Mahle, supra note 66.
101 Sofia Adrogu6 & Hon. Caroline Baker, Litigation in the 21st Century: The Jury Trial, the
Training & the Experts, LITIG. SEC. ST. BAR TEX., THE ADVOC., Fall 2011, at 8, 9.
102 The dissent in Comcast only added fuel to this debate. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436
(Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("[T]he decision should not be read to require, as a
prerequisite to certification, that damages attributable to a classwide injury be measurable on a
class-wide basis." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103 The courts are already adrift in their attempts to reconcile the Supreme Court's mandate
to inquire into the merits of the case as part of a class certification. Compare Levya v. Medline
Indus., Inc., 716 F. 3d 510 (9th Cir. 2013), and In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., No. 04-1616-
JWL, 2013 WL 2097346, at *3 (D. Kan. May 15, 2013) (limiting Comcast), and Harris v.
comScore, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 579, 589 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (labeling Comcast's discussion of Rule
23(b)(3) unbinding dicta), with Forrand v. Fed. Express Corp., CV 08-1360, 2013 WL 1793951,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013) (citing Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432), and Roach v. T.L. Cannon
Corp., No. 3:10-CV-0591, 2013 WL 1316452, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013) (denying
certification and rejecting plaintiffs' argument that individualized damages do not preclude
certification).
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procedural mechanism to pick one expert over another. 104Thus, courts
split on weighing competing expert testimony under Rule 23.105
Early expert challenges just invite confusion between the trial
court's two distinct gatekeeping roles at Rule 23 and under Daubert.106
While gatekeeping under Rule 23 may limit which legal issues reach a
jury, Daubert is purely an admissibility standard. It is not a judge's role
to engage in picking a victor among dueling experts. 07
When the battle of the experts occurs before class certification, it
results in less private enforcement because plaintiffs' experts are
disproportionately excluded.os The only hope for certification is if the
plaintiffs' economist wins the battle. Using Daubert to pick one expert
over another would actually reduce expert testimony by half, since only
one side's expert survives. This result is at odds with any notion of
Daubert as a liberalizing standard.os It also invites courts to engage in
improper credibility assessments of competing experts.110 Given the
adversarial process, it is rare that the judge is independently identifying
variables. Instead, the judge picks one expert's list of controlling
variables over the opposing expert's list.", Such credibility
104 See, e.g., Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2553-54 (2011).
105 See, e.g., Sher v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. App'x 887, 888 (11th Cir. 2011); In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 323-24 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust
Litig., 282 F.R.D. 126, 137 (E.D. Pa. 2011). But see Munoz v. PHH Corp., 1:08-cv-0759, 2013
WL 2146925, at *24 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2013); In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D.
555, 563 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Natchitoches Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., 247 F.R.D.
253, 270 (D. Mass. 2008).
106 Not surprisingly, parties are increasingly using the class certification stage to advance
arguments beyond the scope of a traditional Daubert determination, thus merging the two
separate inquires. See, e.g., Sher, 419 F. App'x at 888 (reversing for failure to weigh expert
testimony but not clarifying whether that weighing should occur as part of the Rule 23 or the
Daubert assessment).
107 FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee's Notes ("When facts are in dispute, experts
sometimes reach different conclusions based on competing versions of the facts. The emphasis
in the amendment on 'sufficient facts or data' is not intended to authorize a trial court to
exclude an expert's testimony on the ground that the court believes one version of the facts and
not the other.").
108 See Langenfeld & Alexander, supra note 16, at 22.
109 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993).
110 Ice Portal, Inc. v. VFM Leonardo, Inc., No. 09-60230-CIV, 2010 WL 2351463, at *5-6
(S.D. Fla. June 11, 2010) (stating "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge. . . ." (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986)) (internal quotations marks omitted), and holding that a change of control provision
susceptible to more than one construction could not be resolved on summary judgment);
Castleberry v. Collierville Med. Assocs. Inc., 92 F.R.D. 492, 493-94 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) ("[A]
motion for summary judgment must be denied where affidavits present a credibility contest
between the parties' expert witnesses on a relevant issue. . . .").
111 See, e.g., In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 863 F. Supp. 2d 966, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
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determinations are solely for the jury.112 A judge may not play fact-
finder under Rule 702.113
Rather than correcting it, circuit decisions have sometimes
encouraged this judicial overreaching. For example, in Sher v. Raytheon
Co., a class action alleging environmental contamination, the trial court
granted certification without first engaging in a full Daubert analysis.114
Recognizing its limited gatekeeping role, the court refused "to declare a
proverbial winner in the parties' war of the battling experts" and
recognized that a Daubert analysis at this premature stage "delves too
far into the merits of Plaintiffs' case."115 In reversing this decision,116 the
Eleventh Circuit explicitly instructed the trial court to use Daubert prior
to certification to weigh competing expert testimony and pick a winner:
"We hold that the district court erred as [a] matter of law by not
sufficiently evaluating and weighing conflicting expert testimony
presented by the parties at the class certification stage."117 With appellate
courts issuing such directives, it is no surprise that courts are routinely
seeing parties make Rule 702 arguments that require judges to play
arbiters between dueling experts.
This improper construction of Daubert fails to acknowledge valid
disagreement amongst economists.'ns It wrongly presumes both experts
cannot be right. Economists themselves debate the "what's reliable
enough" question. As Solow and Fletcher describe, conflicting economic
testimony does not make one expert's testimony unreliable. Rather,
conflict is just an inherent component in economic modeling:
[E]conomists testifying on opposite sides in court will typically
disagree. It does not follow that one of them is engaging in academic
misconduct. Different experts will find different pieces of evidence
persuasive. Different sources of data can point to alternative
112 See, e.g., In re Polyester Staple Antitrust Litig., No. 3:03CV1516, 2007 WL 2111380, at *25
(W.D.N.C. July 19, 2007) (applying Rule 702 because merit discovery was already completed,
but recognizing it would be improper to weigh the opposing expert's testimony at class
certification); In re Playmobile Antitrust Litig., 35 F. Supp. 2d 231, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(recognizing the dueling expert battle is one for jurors to resolve); see also DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-5.000 (2013).
113 See, e.g., In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D. 555, 586 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
114 261 F.R.D. 651, 670 (M.D. Fla. 2009), vacated, 419 F. App'x 887 (11th Cir. 2011).
115 Id.
116 Sher, 419 F. App'x at 890-91.
117 Id. at 888.
118 Gregory G. Wrobel & Ellen Meriwether, Economic Experts: The Challenges of Gatekeepers
and Complexity, ANTITRUST, Summer 2011, at 8, 10 ("Industrial organization economists
engage in lively and ongoing debate among themselves on the viability of these economic
theories and models. The theoretical literature for these debates and the real-world applications
in antitrust cases and government enforcement actions often are technical, mathematical, and
laden with assumptions that are difficult to follow even for experienced antitrust practitioners,
and even more so for courts and juries who encounter such material infrequently, if at all.").
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conclusions, and applying different statistical techniques to the same
body of data can give rise to different inferences.11 9
It is quite possible for economists to rely on the same evidence and
reach contrary but fully supportable conclusions.120 Experts' conclusions
primarily differ on the variables and assumptions underlying their
models. Any theory of competition depends on its assumptions, the
validity of which varies across industries and time. 121 Case law evidences
an assortment of discordant but equally viable analytical methods to
quantify these issues.122 By requiring a Daubert standard that not only
decides whether the economist's testimony is sufficiently reliable but
whose economist is "right," a court is asked to dive into the
exceptionally murky waters of economic theory. 123
Weighing competing testimony also invites courts to improperly
use Daubert to analyze an expert's conclusions rather than his
methodology. By excluding it at class certification, the court is
essentially saying the expert's conclusion that common issues
predominate is unreliable. While a trial court can review how an
economist applies a proposed model, his conclusions are off limits.124
Otherwise, Daubert would essentially decide the subsequent
certification question. If the court buys a lack of fit argument and
accordingly rejects plaintiffs' expert, failure to certify is sure to follow
for lack of predominance. 125
In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation 126 provides a stark example
of how ill-equipped judges are to weigh competing testimony and how
such efforts can result in judicial fact-finding, which is inappropriate
119 Solow & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 497.
120 Id. at 490.
121 Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 951, 1011 (2008).
122 See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551
(2012) (discussing courts' differing ways of measuring competition). Part of the trouble is the
goals of antitrust enforcement are not always consistently defined. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright &
Douglas H. Ginsberg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2405, 2416 (2013).
123 The Supreme Court has already recognized that antitrust examinations are challenging:
[A]ntitrust plaintiffs may bring lawsuits throughout the Nation in dozens of different
courts with different nonexpert judges and different nonexpert juries. In light of the
nuanced nature of the evidentiary evaluations necessary to separate the permissible
from the impermissible, it will prove difficult for those many different courts to reach
consistent results.
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281 (2007).
124 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 23.24 (2004).
125 Amy Dudash, Hydrogen Peroxide: The Third Circuit Comes Clean About the Rule 23
Class Action Certification Standard, 55 VILL. L. REV. 985, 1003 (2010) (discussing how essential
expert testimony is to certify an antitrust class action); Scribner, supra note 9, at 72.
126 863 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
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under Rule 702.127 There, the trial court excluded the testimony of Dr.
Owen Phillips, a well-regarded economics professor at the University of
Wyoming. 128 The case involved allegations of monopoly and attempted
monopoly against promoters of live rock concerts.129 Originally, the
court granted class certification but later reversed its decision upon
evaluating the admissibility of Dr. Phillips's testimony.
The court went far beyond determining admissibility and instead
used Daubert to evaluate which expert's method was more persuasive.
For example, the court held Dr. Phillips failed to consider all the
potential market variables, including how an artist's popularity
impacted promotion. 130 Yet, Dr. Phillips specifically and repeatedly
stated his three separate models all incorporated various market factors,
including artist popularity. 131
Notably, there was no contrary modeling by defendants proving
popularity was statistically significant. Instead, defendants took issue
with how well the models considered popularity. According to
defendants' expert, Dr. Phillips should have considered the top twenty-
five artists rather than the top one hundred.132 The court sided with
defendants' expert, though only plaintiffs' expert actually analyzed the
evidence. The court used analytical fit to justify ignoring the evidence
and improperly evaluated the sufficiency of Dr. Phillips's conclusions. It
substituted evidence and sound methodology with what it called
"common sense" to find popularity would impact pricing. It then
wrongly concluded Dr. Phillips's models must not have considered the
factor. 133
The judge's erroneous conclusions were not limited to fact-finding
about variable selection. The court also rejected Dr. Phillips's market
definition, again by rejecting his factually-supported conclusions.134
127 Id. at 970.
128 In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 98, 124 n.20 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
129 In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
130 Id. at 974-75. The court's own opinion somewhat contradicts its own ruling, saying
popularity was not considered, but then going on to dispute the method Dr. Phillips used to
evaluate this factor. Id.
131 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony of
Dr. Owen Phillips at 7-8, In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 863 F. Supp. 2d 966 (No. 06-ML-
1745-SVW), 2011 WL 11067900 [hereinafter In re Live Concert Motion to Exclude Testimony
of Phillips] (providing details regarding Phillips's analysis on artist popularity). It seems the
court either ignored or misconstrued some of the expert testimony, choosing defendants'
version of Phillips's research rather than Phillips's and plaintiffs' explanation of his conclusions.
But much of the record is under seal, including the expert reports, despite repeated efforts by
plaintiffs to unseal. See Telephone Interview with Jennifer Connolly, Partner, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP (June 27, 2013).
132 In re Live Concert Motion to Exclude Testimony of Phillips, supra note 131, at 9-11.
133 In re Live Concert, Antitrust Litig., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
134 The judge stated he focused "exclusively on Dr. Phillips' methodology, not his results."
Id. at 988. However, in actuality, the judge rejected the conclusion that live rock concerts were
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This ruling is particularly questionable since Dr. Phillips successfully
relied on this exact market definition in a previous antitrust class action
involving notably similar allegations.135 By treading too far into expert
selection, the court excluded Dr. Phillips-essentially killing yet another
private enforcement case.13 6 This result demonstrates just how
dangerous misapplication of Daubert is for antitrust enforcement.
As Live Nation suggests, courts are not well-equipped to evaluate
economic testimony. By their own admission, judges find evaluating
economic experts thorny.137 Jurisprudence is replete with judicial
missteps when economic theory failed to match factual realities.138
Given this potential for error, it is a mistake to make the judge's job
even harder by using Daubert to select between conflicting experts at
class certification.
2. Applying Particular Daubert Factors Skews the Reliability Analysis
In addition to improperly evaluating the sufficiency of competing
expert testimony, Rule 702's reliability requirement also causes
problems for antitrust enforcement. Admittedly, Daubert encourages
judicial flexibility in identifying factors relevant to determine an expert's
the appropriate relevant market because he felt Dr. Phillips did not do enough to start with a
smaller product market before testing for substitution. Id. at 988-89.
135 See Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d
1048, 1082 (D. Colo. 2004).
136 Summary judgment was entered for defendants without first decertifying the class. In re
Live Concert, Antitrust Litig., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
137 Interview with Judge Kathryn Vratil, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 19, 20. There is an
argument that jurors should evaluate this testimony rather than have judges limit the
testimony. In fact, some scholarship suggests that the judicial challenges are so extreme as to
outweigh the potential problems with jurors evaluating such testimony. See, e.g., Brief Amici
Curiae of Neil Vidmar et al., Kumbo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709),
1998 WL 734434. However, such an argument is beyond the scope of this Article, which is more
narrowly focused on the application of Daubert at the class certification stage.
138 Blornkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask. provides a particularly troubling example
of problematic overreliance on economic theory to the hindrance of antitrust enforcement. 203
F.3d 1028, 1031-32 (8th Cir. 2000). The case involved class action allegations by Potash buyers
alleging violation for price-fixing. Id. Though some economists and antitrust scholars recognize
the existence of the alleged cartel, the trial court granted summary judgment. Id. Notably, soon
thereafter, the price for Potash increased 3000 percent, confirming for many that the alleged
price-fixing was more than hypothetical. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public
Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 885, 894 (2012) (discussing impact to food prices stemming
from the alleged Potash conspiracy). These types of questionable determinations by judges
playing arm-chair economists undermine giving such deferential treatment to Daubert
evaluations. See Haw, supra note 92, at 1271 (discussing how judges have a difficult time
distinguishing between admissible factual expert testimony and inadmissible legal conclusions);
Craig Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific Gatekeepers After Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire, and
Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still Seriously Buying This?, 33 UWLA L. REV. 87, 110 (2001)
(discussing theories why judges find expert evaluation so challenging).
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reliability. This makes sense when the type of expert testimony varies.
For example, evaluating a police procedure expert requires a different
set of Rule 702 factors than, say, an epidemiologist. But economists in
antitrust class actions are a fairly homogenous group, justifying more
consensus about the factors relevant to analyzing their testimony.
Instead, courts divide on these factors. As a result, parties are left
uncertain how to bolster their economists against attack, as the bases for
attack change from court to court. 139
In evaluating reliability, courts that apply Daubert factors to
economic testimony are often trying to fit a square peg into a round
hole. At least one court explicitly acknowledged that none of the
Daubert factors are particularly relevant.140 More specifically, though,
some of the factors commonly used are especially difficult for a
plaintiffs' economist to satisfy. When courts use their gatekeeping
discretion to screen out economists based on these factors, private
antitrust enforcement pays the price.
First, a requirement of peer review is problematic for plaintiffs'
economic experts. Much of the modeling used in antitrust cases is made
for litigation and thus not subject to peer review.141 While an
econometric model is essential for a plaintiffs' case, it is optional for a
defendant.142 Thus, using this factor to reject an economist
disproportionately excludes plaintiffs' experts.
Second, acceptance in prior casesl 43 and academic consensus 44 are
frequently-used bases for evaluating Daubert testimony. Given the
quickly-changing contours of economic thought, prior use should not
139 Rudolph F. Pierce & Jennifer M. DeTeso, A Lawyer's Lament: Unpredictability and
Inconsistency in the Wake of the Daubert Trilogy, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 163, 170 (2001).
140 Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1235 (N.D. Ala. 2000) ("The court concludes
that, because of the nature of the issues presented, the Daubert factors are not reasonable
measures of reliability in this case."), affd, 284 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002).
141 Even if defendants offered models, peer review remains a defendant-friendly concept
because defendants more frequently have the financial resources to fund research that has
litigation value. See Leslie Borden & David Ozonoff, Litigation-Generated Science: Why Should
We Care?, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 117, 119 (2008).
142 In re Ready-Mixed Concrete Antitrust Litig., 261 F.RD. 154, 165 (S.D. Ind. 2009); see
also Solow & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 496 ("[Dlefendants' experts are entirely capable of
ignoring inconvenient facts, producing economic models that do not fit the case at hand, and
manipulating statistical results.").
143 See, e.g., Christou v. Beatport, LLC, No. 10-cv-02912, 2013 WL 248058, at *4 (D. Colo.
Jan. 23, 2013) (discussing how economists have been qualified as experts in numerous legal
actions); In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D. 200, 209 (M.D. Pa. 2012)
(same).
144 See Thomas G. Hungar & Ryan G. Koopmans, Appellate Advocacy in Antitrust Cases:
Lessons from the Supreme Court, ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at 53, 54 ("[Tjhe Court in recent
years has frequently looked to the majority views of economists to help resolve antitrust
issues .... ); see also, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889
(2007); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15-18 (1997).
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be given much weight.145 Yet, to the extent that it is, it harms attempts to
expand antitrust enforcement. Much of the prior accepted economic
testimony relies heavily on neo-classical economic modeling that
narrowly defines harm.146 However, other schools of economic thought,
particularly post-Chicago scholarship, reach broader anticompetitive
conduct.147 Looking to prior acceptance and academic consensus leaves
little room for expert testimony reflecting these newer schools of
thought and their accompanying expansion of antitrust enforcement.148
Hence, these factors should not be part of the Daubert evaluation.
Third, using "testability" to measure reliability is problematic for
antitrust economic modeling. 49Testing in this context is often defined
in terms of replication, which looks at whether experts looking at similar
facts reach similar conclusions.15o Unlike scientific testimony, economic
models are not tested through experiments where other variables that
might affect the outcome are controlled.151 Instead, a hypothesis is
developed and historical data are collected on the potentially relevant
variables. Then, regression analysis is used to measure the influence of
each variable in the model. To truly falsify an economic model's
hypothesis in the way "testing" is used in hard sciences requires creating
a real-world functioning market. However, it is virtually impossible to
replicate a market to help differentiate between more important and less
important variables.152 As one antitrust expert explains, "[i]t is doubtful
that much economic testimony would survive a strict and literal
application of the Daubert factors.... [F]ew economic techniques of the
145 Daniel E. Lazdroff, Antitrust Symposium-Introduction: So What Else Is New?, 45 LOy.
L.A. L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2011).
146 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in
Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 638 (2005).
147 Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 847 (2004); Spencer Weber
Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 367, 403 (2009); Wright, supra
note 2.
148 Further, just being grounded in prior precedent does not necessarily make the testimony
more reliable. See Daniel R. Shulman, The Sedona Conference Commentary on the Role of
Economics in Antitrust Law, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 69, 86-87 (2006).
149 City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcos Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 566 n.25 (11th Cir. 1998). But
see In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 18, 26 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
150 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution: An Introduction,
31 J. CORP. L. 287, 290 (2006); cf. Shubha Ghosh, Federal and State Resolutions of the Problem of
Daubert and "Technical or Other Specialized Knowledge," 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 237, 241
(1998) (discussing pre-Kumho how the concept of falsifiability does not strictly fit with
economic modeling).
151 YVES SMITH, ECONNED: How UNENLIGHTENED SELF INTEREST UNDERMINED
DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTED CAPITALISM 56 (2010) (discussing how economics does not use
the traditional scientific method).
152 Andrew I. Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning the Increasingly Fine Line Between the
Admissibility and Sufficiency ofExpert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 663,
673-74 (1997).
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ilk utilized in antitrust litigation could be 'tested' in the sense
contemplated by Daubert. .. ." 153
Continued reliance on these four factors underscores the problem
with judicial discretion in applying Daubert. These factors do not
answer the basic question of whether the testimony is reliable in the
field of economics. Instead, the factors invite courts to improperly
exclude potentially reliable testimony outright. In turn, what should be a
liberal admissibility standard has become an exclusionary one for
antitrust class actions, allowing fewer economists to testify. But reliance
on factors not well-suited to economic testimony is only part of the
problem with requiring additional, earlier Daubert challenges. The
larger problems stem from courts' confusion over how to evaluate
whether the expert properly applies his method to the facts of the case at
class certification, which is discussed next.
3. Misinterpretation of "Analytical Fit" Improperly Excludes
Economists
In addition to relying on faulty factors, courts misapply Rule 702's
application prong. This prong requires courts to consider whether the
economist reliably applied his methodology to the facts of the case.154
The application requirement, often referenced as analytical fit, generally
focuses on two types of potential gaps: (1) a gap between the data the
expert relies on and the facts of the case; and (2) a gap between the
methodology and the opinions, namely how the methodology supports
the proffered conclusion when applied to the given facts.155 Courts
disagree over how large a gap expert testimony can have and still be
admissible, with some courts wrongly equating lack of "analytical fit"
with lack of complete precision.156 An over-exacting analytical fit
153 Id.
154 FED. R. EVID. 702.
155 See Gavil, supra note 95, at 876 (discussing alternative meanings of the "fit"
requirement); Kimberly S. Keller, Bridging the Analytical Gap: The Gammill Alternative to
Overcoming Robinson and Havner Challenges to Expert Testimony, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 277, 310-
12 (2002).
156 See, e.g., In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 863 F. Supp. 2d 966, 976-78 (C.D. Cal. 2012);
cf In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1273 (S.D. Cal. 2010). Originally, the
Supreme Court stated an expert's conclusions were not subject to Daubert. Subsequently, rather
than Daubert's bright-line protection for experts' findings, the Supreme Court in Joiner noted
that in assessing analytical fit, "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another." Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). Thus, the decision provided some
leeway to poke at experts' conclusions, even when based on legitimate methodology. Lucinda
M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 344 (1999).
Technically, the decision did not directly render moot the conclusion vs. methodology
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requirement hinders private enforcement efforts as it further invites
courts to move from judicial gatekeepers to fact-finders.
When analytical fit is too narrowly defined, it becomes an
alternative basis for attacking testimony establishing predominance.57
This is where much of the conflict between experts arises: the
defendant's expert will often claim the plaintiffs' economist either made
too generous an assumption or left out a variable which allegedly would
change the conclusion.s Thus, the defendants argue, the plaintiffs'
model does not "fit" squarely with all the potential facts of the case,
making it too unreliable to admit.
Construing analytical fit to evaluate whether an economist
included the "right" variables makes little sense. Not only does it ignore
how economic modeling works, it blurs the concepts of admissibility
and sufficiency. In economics, which factors should or should not be
included in a proposed regression model is not always crystal clear.
Antitrust economists, particularly those for plaintiffs, often encounter
pricing information that is inconsistent, incomplete, or unobtainable. 159
This can impact what variables and assumptions an economist makes.
However, these models can still be reliable enough for economic
scholarship, and thus for use in court, even if they lack a certain
precision.160 Failing to merely identify a particular variable does not
distinction. But at the same time, it essentially invited trial courts to blur the line between
conclusions and methodology, thus adding a new smudge to the less-than-clear Daubert lens.
Compare Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 303, 308 (D. Me. 2005) (limiting Rule
702 to an expert's methodology and reasoning, not his conclusions), with Monell v. Scooter
Store, Ltd., 895 F. Supp. 2d 398, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating expert testimony should be
excluded when conclusions are inadequately supported) (citing Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 266 (2d. Cir. 2002).
157 See, e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1357 (N.D. Ga.
2000); see also Craftsman Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 777 (8th Cir. 2004)
(holding the expert's testimony on damages should have been excluded because it "failed to
'incorporate all aspects of the economic reality."' (citation omitted)); In re Titanium Dioxide
Antitrust Litig., No. 10-0318, 2013 WL 1855980, at *9 (D. Md. May 1, 2013); In re Urethane
Antitrust Litig., No. 04-1616-JWL, 2012 WL 6681783, at *7-8 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2012); Gavil,
supra note 95, at 862-65, 869-72 (citing Blomkest and Concord Boats as cases where missing
variables lead to exclusion of expert testimony); Lopatka & Page, supra note 146, at 692-93.
This argument is usually raised by defendants and used with a tag-along argument. The
defendant often goes on to claim once those variables are included, and plaintiffs can no longer
establish common impact or use a common damage methodology. See, e.g., In re Linerboard
Antitrust Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
158 See, e.g., In re Titanium Dioxide, 2013 WL 1855980, at *9 (discussing defendant's
argument that plaintiffs expert "cherry-picked" facts); In re Urethane, 2012 WL 6681783, at *7-
8.
159 See Solow & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 494 (discussing marginal cost data as an example
of unobtainable information).
160 For example, some courts admit models with heteroscedasticity, though such models
would likely face difficulty standing up to an overly rigid analytical fit analysis. See, e.g., Estate
of Hill v. ConAgra Poultry Co., No. 4:94CV0198, 1997 WL 538887, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 25,
1997); Denny v. Westfield State Coil., 669 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D. Mass. 1987).
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necessarily make the model unreliable outright.161 As Judge Walls
explains, "[ilt is only the rare case where the 'regressions are so
incomplete as to be irrelevant' and the expert's decisions regarding
control variables are the basis to exclude the analysis."162
Analytical fit does require a court to consider whether the expert
testimony matches the facts of the case, but only in a general sense.16 3
Analytical fit is really just the stricter cousin of relevancy. The fit test
simply screens out junk sciencel64 rather than mandating a nuanced,
detailed understanding of the particularities of the case.165 Viewed more
accurately as a heightened relevancy requirement, analytical fit focuses
on whether the expert testimony matches the facts, not necessarily how
well. 166 The court can consider whether the facts of the case allow for a
certain type of modeling; for example, whether a yardstick model for
computing class-wide damages applies to the particular antitrust
violation at issue. What is not permissible under Rule 702 is second-
guessing which facts must be included in impact or damages models.
Often, the latter question forces courts to make merit determinations,
thus directly drawing judges further away from their proper position
behind the bench and toward the jury box to serve as fact-finders. 167
Viewing analytical fit as just a relevancy standard makes sense
because whether enough variables are included impacts the testimony's
sufficiency, not its admissibility.168 The admissibility determination is
161 Rubenfeld, supra note 36, at 188 (discussing how failure to include a variable goes more
to the probative value of the model than its admission).
162 Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 01-5302, 2006 WL 3246605, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 6,
2006) (quoting another source).
163 For example, in one case, a plaintiff sued defendant Phillip Morris claiming its cigarette
was defective because it had an unreasonable propensity to ignite upholstered furniture.
Kearney v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 61 (D. Mass. 1996). Plaintiff offered expert
testimony regarding the flammability of a particular type of fabric. However, the fabric was not
used on the couch at issue. Consequently, the court rejected the expert testimony under
Daubert's "fit" requirement. Id. at 67.
164 Bobak Razavi, Admissible Expert Testimony and Summary Judgment, 29 J. LEGAL MED.
307, 315 (2008).
165 In fact, Daubert itself provides a clear example of how the standard for fit is loose and
intended to exclude junk science like astrology. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 591-95 (1993); see also supra Part I.A.
166 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92; see also Miller v. Farmers Ins. Grp., CIV-10-466-F, 2012 WL
8017244, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 2012); S.E.C. v. Johnson, 525 F. Supp. 2d 70, 74 (D.D.C.
2007); M. Michelle Jones, Using Daubert Principles to Determine If Other Incidents Are
Substantially Similar in Design Defect Cases, 6 CHARLESTON L. REv. 685, 722 (2012).
167 Adrogu6 & Baker, supra note 101, at 14 ("The judge, as a neutral decision-maker, wears a
robe, which represents a separating veil between him and the litigants. This veil is torn and
neutrality compromised when a judge is asked to step in and interpret the facts.").
168 City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 563 (11th Cir. 1998). The trial
court's Daubert analysis in City of Tuscaloosa demonstrates how the admissibility/sufficiency
distinction can blur. There, the plaintiffs' economic expert offered testimony on collusion. City
of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504, 1513 (N.D. Ala. 1995), affd in part,
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more generous than evaluating whether the expert testimony proves the
case. 169 Sufficiency, in contrast, evaluates whether the collective weight
of the evidence is adequate to present a jury question.170 Sufficiency
looks at the overall persuasiveness of the party's entire case, not just the
expert testimony.
A helpful analogy for considering the sufficiency/admissibility
distinction is assembling a jigsaw puzzle. The plaintiffs' economist is
asked to piece together a puzzle. If fully assembled, the complete puzzle
would provide a precise picture of the underlying market. But often, not
all the pieces of the puzzle are available. The economist may only be able
to assemble a percentage of the overall picture. Although the entire
picture is not visible, the picture the expert presents can still aid the
finder of fact.
Sufficiency considers whether there is enough of the picture to
justify the expert's conclusion. The plaintiffs' expert may say that even
without all the pieces, he can still draw a conclusion as to the puzzle's
image. In contrast, admissibility is a much looser threshold: it considers
whether the expert's methodology in piecing together the puzzle makes
sense given the shape or image of the puzzle itself-regardless of how
much of the puzzle it reveals.
Despite this distinction, courts still confuse sufficiency and
admissibility, as occurred in El Aguila Food Products Inc. v. Gruma
Corp. 171 In that antitrust case, one of plaintiffs' experts offered testimony
about whether defendant's action demonstrated market power. The
expert relied on industry information generated by others, including a
vacated in part, 158 F.3d 548. The economist's testimony focused on plus-factors, such as a
smaller number of firms, low demand elasticity, and acting against the firms' interests. Id. at
1513-15. The trial judge excluded the report under Rule 702, finding the expert's
methodologies failed to distinguish between unlawful and lawful parallel pricing. Id. at 1534.
After excluding the report, summary judgment was granted since the plaintiffs now lacked
evidence of collusion. Id. at 1538. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the trial court's
interpretation of the rule erroneous as a matter of law. City of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 563. The
court admonished the trial court for confusing the sufficiency of the testimony and its
admissibility. The appellate court pointed out that expert testimony alone does not need to
make the plaintiffs' case but rather is just a part of the case. Id. at 564-65. Part of the confusion
between admissibility and sufficiency likely stems from the increased summary judgment
requirement for antitrust cases post-Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986); see also Gavil, supra note 152, at 689-91.
169 Some courts already recognize this and view the standard for fit as "not that high." See In
re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Kordek v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 921 F. Supp. 2d 422, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2013); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. S & T
Bank, No. 07-01086, 2010 WL 786257, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010).
170 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1132 (2d Cir. 1995)
(distinguishing between inquiry into admissibility of expert evidence and "[a] sufficiency
inquiry, which asks whether the collective weight of a litigant's evidence is adequate to present a
jury question").
171 301 F. Supp. 2d 612 (S.D. Tex. 2003), affd, 131 F. App'x 450 (5th Cir. 2005).
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Federal Trade Commission study on the specific anticompetitive
conduct at issue.172 Based on his research, he then offered his opinion. 173
The trial court rejected the expert testimony, applying a narrow
definition of the analytical fit requirement. 174 The problems that the
court relied on to exclude the testimony highlight a fundamental
misinterpretation of analytical fit. For example, the court noted several
potential areas where the marketing expert could have further
researched the industry, including conducting retailer interviews to
determine how the agreements at issue affected retailers' space
allocation for the relevant product.175
However, just because the plaintiffs' expert could have gone further
in analyzing the market does not render his testimony inadmissible. The
testimony still relied on sound economic modeling and applied that
model to relevant facts. That the expert could have considered
additional facts goes to the testimony's sufficiency, not necessarily its
admissibility under Daubert.176
The court's blurring of admissibility and sufficiency killed the case.
Plaintiffs' damages expert in part relied on the market power testimony,
so his testimony was also stricken.177 Without any supporting economic
testimony, the court found there were no longer any triable issues of
fact, and thus granted summary judgment for defendant.178 Then, given
the deference afforded to a trial court's Rule 702 decision, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the ruling.179
Since courts have accepted misconstrued analytical fit arguments
to exclude experts at later procedural stages,1so it is only a matter of time
before this same flawed interpretation of Daubert seeps into the class
certification setting. 181 The number of analytical fit challenges to
172 Id. at 624.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 623-24.
175 Id.
176 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (noting even shaky
testimony is admissible).
177 El Aguila Food Prods., 301 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
178 Id. at 633.
179 El Aguila Food Prods., Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 131 F. App'x 450 (5th Cir. 2005).
180 See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1047, 1056-57 (8th Cir.
2000); Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (8th Cir.
1999); In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1503-05 (D. Kan. 1995);
see also Sandra F. Gavin, Managerial Justice in a Post-Daubert World: A Reliability Paradigm,
234 FED. RULES DECISIONS 196, 212 (2006) (discussing harm of Daubert at summary
judgment). Not all courts have fallen for these arguments, though. See, e.g., In re Indus. Silicon
Antitrust Litig., No. 95-2104, 1998 WL 1031507, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998) (noting
defendants cannot just point to excluded variables but must instead demonstrate such variables
matter).
181 The success of these arguments has been limited to date. See, e.g., Christou v. Beatport
Inc., No. 10-cv-02912, 2013 WL 248058, at * 4 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2013). Some courts have even
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economic experts will likely increase in relation to the number of courts
requiring a full Daubert assessment before class certification. Given the
great latitude trial courts have in these cases and the incredible pressure
to resolve cases earlier than ever using their gatekeeping power, it seems
quite possible testimony that is appropriate for a Rule 23 determination
may not necessarily be sufficient for an early application of a strict
Daubert test.
Since sufficiency hurdles already exist at summary judgment,182
analytical fit does not need to serve this purpose. There is little reason to
think the adversarial process will not sufficiently weed out testimony
that lacks adequate factual foundation.183 As the Supreme Court stated,
even "shaky" expert testimony should clear Daubert.184 Any contrary
interpretation of "analytical fit" invites courts to improperly extend
their gatekeeping power by determining whether the testimony fits the
facts of the case well enough to allow the case to proceed, rather than
focusing on admissibility.
Given how economic models are designed, applying analytical fit to
economists at class certification is particularly illogical. Plaintiffs need
not prove their case at class certification.s5 Even with the recent
increased Rule 23 rigor, plaintiffs' obligation at class certification is only
to explain how they propose to prove their case once class and merit
discovery are complete.186 Thus, the plaintiffs are not required to
provide full reports on impact and damages but rather proposals of how
to design methodologies to generate the reports.s 7 All the facts the
gone so far as to acknowledge that a missing variable does not make testimony unreliable. See,
e.g., In re Linerboard, 497 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677-78 (E.D. Pa. 2007); In re Polypropylene Carpet
Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2000); In re Indus. Silicon, 1998 WL
1031507, at *3. But this limited success is more attributable to the limited number of cases
explicitly running through Daubert prior to class certification.
182 29 CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6266 (1st ed. 1982)
("Accordingly, where expert testimony is based on well-established science, the courts generally
have concluded that reliability problems go to weight, not admissibility.").
183 Even the Supreme Court in Daubert stated: "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes
("Daubert did not work a seachange over federal evidence law, and the trial court's role as
gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system." (quoting
another source) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
184 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
185 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Rail
Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 287 F.R.D. 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, 725 F.3d 244
(D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Class
action proponents may not be called upon to prove their case in order to obtain certification.").
186 In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311.
187 See, e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 178 F.R.D. 603, 618 (N.D. Ga. 1997);
In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 170 F.R.D. 524, 531 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (noting
plaintiffs need only proffer a colorable method of proving common impact); 7AA WRIGHT ET
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expert may consider are not yet settled, nor will they be until trial.
Consequently, the best course is to postpone Daubert until later in the
case. 188
B. Starting with Rule 702 Negatively Impacts the Rule 23 Inquiry
In addition to inviting misconstruction of Rule 702, a Daubert
analysis before class certification gives judicial gatekeepers too much
power to shut out antitrust claims. Starting class certification
determinations with Rule 702 makes certification less likely, regardless
of the merits of the case. This outcome was neither intended by Daubert
nor has been properly considered by the courts adopting this
requirement.
As a preliminary matter, the rationale behind Daubert makes little
sense in the class certification setting. The underlying goal of Daubert-
protecting jurors from questionable expert testimony-is not triggered
at class certification, where there are no jurors involved. 189 Rule 23 is a
notably different assessment than summary judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, where Daubert motions are more common.
Rule 56 is essentially a jury-orientated standard, which evaluates
whether a reasonable juror could potentially find for the opposing
party.19o Given this standard, a judge has a logical basis to evaluate what
admissible evidence a jury would hear. In contrast, class certification is
purely a judicial determination without consideration for potential
jurors.191 No jury will ever need to determine whether common issues
predominate. While Daubert makes some logical sense at summary
judgment, that logic does not apply at class certification.
AL., supra note 182, § 1781; J. Douglas Richards & Benjamin D. Brown, Predominance of
Common Questions-Common Mistakes in Applying the Class Action Standard, 41 RUTGERS L.J.
163, 170 (2009) ("[TJhe requirement of predominance does not ask a court to determine
whether proposed common methods of proof are correct or incorrect, persuasive or
unpersuasive. Instead, all it asks the court to determine is whether common questions
predominate and whether the plaintiff genuinely has viable common methods of proof.").
188 If new evidence impacts the class's homogeneity, the court has ways to cure this,
including subclassing. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5).
189 In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011).
190 FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56; see also, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124,
1131 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[W]e must determine whether, drawing all reasonable inferences
regarding the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses in favor of plaintiff, a
reasonable jury could only have found for the defendants.").
191 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 124, § 21.21. The Manual's
position on the Daubert assessment is highly confusing; it characterizes a Rule 23
determination as the judge being the trier of fact. Nonetheless, it goes on to invite judges to
engage in a Daubert assessment without any guidance on how to reconcile the bench trial
nature of Rule 23 determinations. Id. § 21.133.
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Though Daubert does not belong at class certification at all, it is
particularly problematic when it precedes, rather than follows, the Rule
23 evaluation.192 As discussed below, this sequencing makes reviewing
the trial court's procedural roadblock more difficult because of the great
discretion afforded trial courts' admissibility rulings. Further, starting
certification with Rule 702 heightens the requirements for class
certification because Daubert evaluations lack some of the carefully
crafted pro-enforcement presumptions that exist for antitrust cases.
In jurisdictions that begin class certification determinations with
Daubert, the party appealing an adverse ruling faces a more uphill battle
to reverse any faulty gatekeeping.193 Despite research establishing
judges' failings in making these decisions,194 such rulings are given great
deference.195 A Daubert determination is only subject to review for
abuse of discretion.196 This is notably higher than the de novo review
given class certification decisions. 197
192 Compare In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 071873, 2008
WL 5423488, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 2008) (starting class certification analysis with Rule 23
then moving to Rule 702), with In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D. 200,
207 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (starting with Rule 702 then moving to Rule 23).
193 This deferential review is not without its critics. Concern with the abuse of discretion
review has lead several state courts to refuse to adopt this portion of the Daubert jurisprudence.
See, e.g., State v. Dahood, 814 A.2d 159, 161-62 (N.H. 2002); Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 14 P.3d 596, 604 (Or. 2000). Other state courts go further and reject Daubert outright,
taking a more liberal viewpoint on expert admissibility. For example, in Idaho, a "bare analysis"
of expert testimony suffices. Carnell v. Baker Mgmt., Inc., 48 P.3d 651, 656-57 (Idaho 2002). In
North Dakota, expert testimony is admissible so long as the witnesses have "some degree of
expertise in the field in which they are to testify." Hamilton v. Oppen, 653 N.W.2d 678, 683
(N.D. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. A.P.I. Co. of Minn., 559 N.W.2d 204, 206 (N.D. 1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
194 Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert's Legacy of
Confusion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1085, 1099 (2006); see also supra note 137 (discussing
the difficulty judges have in evaluating expert testimony).
195 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997). This deferential standard suggests
confidence in trial courts' abilities to evaluate expert testimony. This is somewhat ironic given
the Chief Justice authored Joiner-only after authoring the concurrence in Daubert where he
spent much of the opinion airing his concerns with federal judges' abilities to evaluate expert
testimony. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court's "Criminal" Daubert Cases, 33 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1071, 1080 (2003).
196 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142.
197 Though Rule 23 determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, whether the
court applied the correct standard of proof is reviewed under the more rigorous de novo
standard. See, e.g., Yokoyama v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir.
2010); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 201
(2d Cir. 2008); see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir.
2008) ("We review a class certification order for abuse of discretion .... Whether an incorrect
legal standard has been used is an issue of law to be reviewed de novo." (quoting another
source) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 573
(7th Cir. 2008) ("We generally review a grant of class certification for an abuse of discretion,
but 'purely legal' determinations made in support of that decision are reviewed de novo."
(citing Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1997)). In contrast, Daubert
determinations are strictly subject to abuse of discretion review. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142.
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Given the profound importance of expert testimony at class
certification, it is difficult to justify broad deference to a trial court's
decision. It deprives the parties their right to have a jury make factual
and credibility determinations.198 It also denies appellate courts a solid
basis to assess the trial court's ruling.199 A trial court's determination of
an expert's reliability based on an incomplete factual record receives
greater protection than a trial court's decision post-trial that the
testimony does not support a jury verdict as a matter of law.200 As
Professor Cheng explains, "[t]he application of an abuse-of-discretion
standard is perfectly in line with appellate review standards for other
evidentiary rulings, but critically misses the generality that distinguishes
scientific from ordinary adjudicative facts."201
Further, this extreme deference to trial court Daubert decisions
sacrifices the more cerebral and academic understanding of testimony
that usually accompanies appellate decisions.202 It limits appellate courts
from articulating clear, consistent guidelines to evaluate an antitrust
expert's proposed methodology203-an inquiry that should not be tied to
the facts of the case so much as the legitimacy of the model. It also leaves
room for potential judicial bias to creep into the decision-making.204
There is already evidence of a correlation between a judge's political
affiliation and his proclivity to use judicial gatekeeping power to
foreclose plaintiffs' right of access in civil cases generally.205 This bias is
only exacerbated in antitrust cases, as much of the economic modeling
in these cases support contingent claims with redistributive results.206
Thus, particular political viewpoints can impact how reliable an expert
198 David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the
Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 473 (2008); Anne S. Toker, Note, Admitting Scientific
Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 185 (1991).
199 Giannelli, supra note 195, at 1078-79.
200 Christopher B. Hockett & Frank M. Hinman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony in
Antitrust Cases: Does Daubert Raise a New Barrier to Entry for Economists?, ANTITRUST,
Summer 1996, at 40, 45.
201 Edward K. Cheng, Scientific Evidence as Foreign Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1110
(2010).
202 Faigman, supra note 50, at 922. Appellate courts are generally more cerebral and
academic. Id.
203 Amy B. Hargis & Joe R. Patranella, Rethinking Review: The Increasing Need for a
Practical Standard of Review on Daubert Issues in Place of Joiner, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 409, 417
(2011).
204 Robert P. Mosteller, Finding the Golden Mean with Daubert: An Elusive, Perhaps
Impossible, Goal, 52 VILL. L. REV. 723, 758 (2007); Kimberly Wise, Peering into the Judicial
Magic Eight Ball: Arbitrary Decisions in the Area of Juror Removal, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 813,
832 (2009).
205 See Erin B. Kaheny, Appellate Judges as Gatekeepers? An Investigation of Threshold
Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 12 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 255, 257 (2011)
(discussing how Republican-appointed judges exercise their gatekeeping power more
frequently than Democrat-appointed judges on right of access determinations).
206 Haw, supra note 92, at 1294.
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seems. 20 7 As a result, the level of review for Daubert decisions makes the
sequencing of Rule 702 and Rule 23 highly relevant.
The order of Daubert and Rule 23 also matters for a second reason.
While both Rule 23 and Daubert are often characterized as "one size fits
all" tests, 208 the last several decades of antitrust jurisprudence belies that,
at least as to Rule 23. Instead of a draconian application of Rule 23,
courts have developed a series of presumptions for assessing antitrust
claims.
These presumptions intersect with numerous areas of economist
testimony. Even in a big picture way, many courts recognize that class
certification is generally appropriate in price-fixing class actions.209
Under Rule 23, for numerosity, while the class size cannot be based on
speculation, it can be in part based on common sense assumptions. 210
Presumptions also exist for satisfying Rule 23(b)(3) criteria. For
example, some courts presume class-wide impact in price-fixing cases in
industries with particular pricing structures. 211 Others go further to
assume impact so long as there is common proof of individual
damages.212 As for predominance, the presumptions are tailored to
207 Id. The relationship between judicial gatekeeping and a judge's political affiliation is well
documented. See, e.g., Kaheny, supra note 205, at 257; C.K. Rowland & Bridget Jeffery Todd,
Where You Stand Depends on Who Sits: Platform Promises and Judicial Gatekeeping in the
Federal District Courts, 53 J. POL. 175, 181-83 (1991).
208 "Rule 23 provides a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding the class-action question."
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399 (2010).
209 See, e.g., In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. M 02-
1486 PJH, 2006 WL 1530166, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006) ("Accordingly, when courts are in
doubt as to whether certification is warranted, courts tend to favor class certification."); In re
Rubber Chem. Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 346, 350 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("Courts have stressed that
price-fixing cases are appropriate for class certification because a class-action lawsuit is the
most fair and efficient means of enforcing the law where antitrust violations have been
continuous, widespread, and detrimental to as yet unidentified consumers." (quoting another
source) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209
F.R.D. 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2002); In re Playmobil Antitrust Litig., 35 F. Supp. 2d 231, 238
(E.D.N.Y. 1998).
210 See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1532, 2006 WL
623591, at *2 (D. Me. Mar. 10, 2006) (citing McCuin v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 817
F.2d 161, 167 (1st Cir. 1987)); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 297, 303 (E.D.
Mich. 2001). See generally In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing how numerosity can be satisfied with a "rough estimate");
Uniondale Beer Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 340, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Where, as
here, it is apparent that the members of the class would be very numerous, Rule 23 (a)(1) is
satisfied.").
211 While the Supreme Court rejected this presumption in Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 341 (1990), some lower courts still adopt this presumption. See,
e.g., In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 346, 352 (N.D. Cal. 2005). But see In re
Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 287 F.R.D. 1, 41 (D.D.C. 2012) (stating this
presumption is more akin to a presumption-plus, meaning some additional evidence is needed
for common impact).
212 The Third Circuit has held: "when an antitrust violation impacts upon a class of persons
who do have standing, there is no reason in doctrine why proof of the impact cannot be made
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remedying the challenges of generating class-wide damage calculations.
An expert's report can and often is based on factual assumptions.213 This
means an economist's proposed model could arguably satisfy Rule 23
without fully considering all market variables. Some courts go further
and hold the need to calculate damages individually does not preclude
predominance.214
While courts disagree over the weight and sometimes the existence
of these presumptions, plaintiffs continue to successfully rely on them to
seek certification.215 Underlying these presumptions is a general
understanding that antitrust cases pose particular challenges that make
narrow interpretations of Rule 23 conflict with private antitrust
enforcement's goals of compensation and deterrence.216 In essence,
certain presumptions evolved over time to even the playing field
between the parties in antitrust cases.
While these presumptions are essential for private antitrust suits,217
starting certification determinations with Rule 702 means the
presumptions are essentially gutted. In cases where a court completes a
full Daubert analysis prior to the Rule 23 determination, these
on a common basis so long as the common proof adequately demonstrates some damage to
each individual." Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Am.
Seed Co. v. Monsanto Co., 271 F. App'x 138, 140 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Linerboard Antitrust
Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2002).
213 Shulman, supra note 148, at 88 ("The theoretical and empirical modeling tools of
economics invariably incorporate assumptions that may not perfectly comport with any
particular factual setting, and they may nevertheless appropriately form a basis for an economic
opinion.").
214 See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 139-40 (2d Cir.
2001), overruled on other grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir.
2006), and superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Attenborough v. Constr. and
Gen. Bldg. Laborers' Local 79, 238 F.R.D. 82, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re NASDAQ Market
Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826
F. Supp. 1019, 1043-44 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (explaining that individual damages issues are rarely
a barrier to certification and finding predominance was satisfied because the plaintiffs
proposed method of determining damages was not "so insubstantial and illusive as to amount
to no method at all").
215 See supra note 214; see also In re Aftermarket Auto. Lighting Prods. Antitrust Litig., 276
F.R.D. 364, 369 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (discussing proving antitrust impact through common damage
calculations).
216 Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of
Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 969, 1033 (2010).
217 See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney, 280 F.3d at 140 ("[I]f defendants' argument (that
the requirement of individualized proof on the question of damages is in itself sufficient to
preclude class treatment) were uncritically accepted, there would be little if any place for the
class action device in the adjudication of antitrust claims. Such a result should not be and has
not been readily embraced by the various courts confronted with the same argument. The
predominance requirement calls only for predominance, not exclusivity, of common
questions." (alteration in original) (quoting another source)); see also In re Catfish Antitrust
Litig., 826 F. Supp. at 1044; In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 82 F.R.D. 143, 154 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
affd, 685 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1982).
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presumptions play little to no role.218 Thus, in those courts that decide
Daubert before Rule 23, the barriers to certification are greater than in
courts that begin with Rule 23. Without these presumptions, a strict
Daubert test is harder to win than the already demanding Rule 23 test.
Given this judicial deference and the loss of key antitrust
presumptions, requiring Rule 702 evaluations before class certification
improperly elevates judicial gatekeeping at the expense of antitrust
enforcement. To remedy this imbalance, expert testimony offered for
class certification should be treated more like evidence in a bench trial.
A bench trial eliminates the concerns with hoodwinked jurors. Hence,
rather than applying Daubert to exclude the expert testimony, the
preference is to admit even borderline testimony and afford it the
appropriate weight (even if that is just slight).219 This same approach
should be used in class actions: keep Daubert out of class certification
and instead raise it later in the litigation, as the case proceeds closer to
the jury Daubert aims to protect. Otherwise, the trend to misapply
Daubert before class certification transforms judges from gatekeepers
into bricklayers, erecting unnecessary barriers to private antitrust
enforcement.
III. EARLY DAUBERTCHALLENGES ARE UNJUSTIFIED
Despite the litany of problems with Daubert motions at class
certification, these earlier motions are on the rise, begging the simple
question: why? This Part explores the proffered rationales for adding
earlier Daubert motions and finds them insufficient to offset the
resulting harm to private antitrust enforcement.
Proponents of adding yet another Daubert hurdle must
substantiate the need for additional expert challenges, particularly given
Daubert motions can already be brought at multiple stages of litigation.
While private antitrust often gets swept up in anti-class action rhetoric,
these cases provide essential deterrence and compensation for
anticompetitive conduct.220 Adding obstacles to these claims means
218 See, e.g., In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 863 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971-72 (C.D. Cal. 2012);
In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D. 200, 218 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
219 See, e.g., N.W.B. Imports & Exports Inc. v. Eiras, 3:03-CV-1071-J-32-MMH, 2005 WL
5960920, at "1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2005); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F.
Supp. 2d 1011, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 2003), superseded on other grounds as stated in 403 F.3d 1331,
1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
220 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 241 (Apr.
2007) ("The vitality of private antitrust enforcement in the United States is largely attributed to
two factors: (1) the availability of treble damages plus costs and attorneys' fees, and (2) the U.S.
class action mechanism, which allows plaintiffs to sue on behalf of both themselves and
similarly situated, absent plaintiffs.").
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overall less private enforcement.221 This new obstacle is particularly
suspect if it distorts the class certification determination and permits
judicial gatekeeping to snuff out bona fide antitrust claims. 222 As Justice
Kagan recently noted, it does not matter precisely how one's right to
bring an antitrust suit is infringed; so long as it is, the courts should not
allow it.223 A contrary conclusion essentially allows an evidentiary
standard to immunize antitrust wrongdoing. Consequently, this
dramatic change in the timing of Daubert review requires considerable
justification.
What follows in this Part is a thorough discussion of how the
current rationalizations for early Daubert motions lack merit.
Justifications for evaluating antitrust economists before class
certification are mixed. Some proponents offer reasons that fail to
address why Daubert is needed specifically at class certification. For
example, some focus on the dangers of "junk science."224 However,
while economic modeling has its flaws, it is far from the fields of true
"junk science," such as palmistry and astrology, that Daubert fears.
Others cite to concerns about potentially misleading jurors.2 25 But as
previously discussed, jurors play no part in the class certification
determination.226
221 Baxter, supra note 10, at 691 ("Private litigation, particularly in cases in which the
injuries resulting from the unlawful conduct are not widespread, is an effective tool both in
identifying existing violations and in deterring future violations by the offender or by others
similarly situated."); see also California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990)
(acknowledging private enforcement plays "an integral part of the congressional plan for
protecting competition"); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)
(describing the private right of action as a "bulwark of antitrust enforcement").
222 In fact, this exact complaint was initially raised when Daubert was first added to
summary judgment. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir.
1995) (reversing the lower court for improperly weighing expert evidence). Within a few years,
the number of summary judgment motions granted almost doubled, with ninety percent of
those rulings going against plaintiffs. LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE
THE DAUBERT DECISION 62 (2001), available at http://www.rand.org/publications? MR/
MR1439/ MR1439.pdf. For an extensive discussion of the harm to plaintiffs of adding Daubert
to summary judgment, see generally Gavin, supra note 180.
223 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
224 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 798 (3d Cir. 1994); Pecover v. Elec. Arts
Inc., No. C 08-2820 VRW, 2010 WL 8742757, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2010) ("Given that class
actions consume vast judicial resources and that many defendants face substantial settlement
pressures as a result of class certification, . .. it hardly seems appropriate to allow flimsy expert
opinions to buttress plaintiffs' [Rule] 23 arguments.... [A] Daubert analysis of every
challenged expert opinion seems prudent in fulfilling the court's obligation to ensure actual
conformance with [Rule] 23 . . . .").
225 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure
of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 489 (2008) (discussing some scholars' concerns
with expert testimony misleading jurors).
226 See supra Part II.
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Other arguments do specifically focus on Daubert review at class
certification. Some contend early Daubert motions allow for judicial
gatekeeping needed to save resources and avoid forced settlements.227 As
detailed below, these arguments either miss the mark or lack empirical
support. First, there are already numerous gatekeeping checks on
antitrust class actions; adding Daubert as a new check is unnecessary.
Second, requiring Daubert before class certification does little to
preserve limited judicial and enforcement resources. Third, rather than
minimizing settlement pressure, this new hurdle merely shifts the
pressure from defendants to plaintiffs.
Without a strong basis to defend its danger to private enforcement,
doubts about Daubert disappear. The best answer becomes leaving
Daubert entirely out of antitrust class certification decisions.228 Instead,
Daubert should remain at more proper stages: pre-trial or at summary
judgment. This approach allows courts to screen experts without
unnecessarily wounding antitrust enforcement.
A. Increased Private Antitrust Gatekeeping Is Unwarranted
Despite their harm to private enforcement, early Daubert
assessments are often trumpeted as essential to gatekeeping.229 In
essence, proponents of adding this new hurdle contend that increased
gatekeeping is better, without pointing to any specific need for more
barriers to enforcement. While this argument borrows the term
gatekeeping from Daubert, its focus is notably different. Under Daubert,
judicial gatekeeping protects jurors.230 Here, this gatekeeping protects
defendants from potentially meritorious litigation-a concern
conspicuously absent in Daubert.
Even assuming that more gatekeeping is needed in antitrust cases,
proponents of early Daubert motions fail to establish that another round
of expert challenges is the appropriate new gate. Expert testimony will
still be repeatedly screened without early Daubert review. First, the
227 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 972, 979 (1986) ("To set the jury adrift on uncharted seas-and then to defer to whatever
it does-is to introduce considerable risk into all business decisions.").
228 The few scholars who have actually evaluated both sides of the debate acknowledge the
burden disproportionately impacts plaintiffs. See, e.g., Adrogu6 & Baker, supra note 101, at 13
(discussing how Daubert has a chilling effect on plaintiffs' attorneys); Miller, supra note 3, at
313-14 ("Daubert's high threshold has been particularly burdensome-financially, logistically,
and sometimes both-for plaintiffs."). As Adrogu6 and Baker explain, "[t]he standard set out in
Daubert can be insurmountable and leaves many legitimate claims without a proper remedy."
Adrogu6 & Baker, supra note 101, at 13.
229 See Biesanz & Burt, supra note 84, at 61-68.
230 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
2014]1 2185
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
testimony is screened under Rule 23 to determine if it sufficiently proves
or disproves predominance. Only convincing testimony will satisfy the
ever-rising Rule 23 bar. Next the parties would again raise expert
challenges at summary judgment, both under Rule 702 and Rule 56.
Motions to strike expert testimony are already pro forma at summary
judgment in antitrust class actions.231
The expert challenges are far from over, as parties can again raise
Daubert pre-trial through motions in limine, during trial, and
subsequently post-trial.232 Since Daubert challenges are already
repeatedly brought, it is unclear how adding another round of
challenges is a necessary assertion of judicial gatekeeping.
More importantly, the underlying premise that further gatekeeping
is needed in these cases lacks foundation. The bipartisan Antitrust
Modernization Commission recently considered critics' claims that
antitrust laws resulted in excessive payments by defendants. During
their investigation, the Commission sought testimony and evidence to
determine whether additional gatekeeping was needed. It concluded:
"[n]o actual cases or evidence of systematic overdeterrence were
presented to the Commission.. . ."233
As it stands, even without Daubert at class certification, plaintiffs
must win five times to get to trial: (1) on a motion to dismiss; (2) at class
certification; (3) on a Rule 702 challenge pre-summary judgment; (4) at
summary judgment; and (5) on a renewed Rule 702 challenge pre-
trial.234 Not surprisingly, such trials have increasingly become a rarity,235
which suggests these cases require no further judicial gatekeeping.
Even assuming there were any lingering needs to filter out spurious
antitrust class claims, the Supreme Court has added substantial
gatekeeping to many of these five existing hurdles during the last decade
alone.236 In federal court, where these claims are primarily brought, it is
now harder to get into court; harder to plead an antitrust claim; and
231 Solow & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 497.
232 See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1046 (8th Cir. 2000);
Craftsman Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-3454-CV-S-AE-ECF, 2002 WL 34448786,
at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2002); Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (D. Utah
2001) (denying motion in limine to exclude expert testimony but subsequently granting motion
to strike expert after hearing expert testimony during trial), affd, 306 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir.
2002).
233 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 220, at 247.
234 Edward D. Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 119 (2011).
235 Id. (discussing data on the vanishing trial).
236 Daniel E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust Litigation, 7 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. L.J. 1, 4651 (2006). For a thorough discussion of increased gatekeeping under the Roberts
Court, see generally Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure
Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313 (2012).
2186 [Vol. 35:2147
2014] DEATH BY DAUBERT 2187
harder to certify a class.237 The full consequences of these barriers
remain to be seen. There is evidence, however, that these barriers
already limit potentially meritorious antitrust class claims.238 This makes
the need for further obstacles even more questionable.
One of the primary new gates to antitrust claims is Twombly.239
Twombly empowers judges to dismiss claims they deem implausible
based on their "judicial experience and common sense."240 This means
antitrust plaintiffs must now prove up their case without the aid of
discovery.241 For many areas of law, this standard means little. For
example, in a typical contract case, a plaintiff need only allege facts for
each element of the claim, with potentially more emphasis on breach
and damages allegations. So long as a party states facts "plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with)" illegal conduct,242 the
complaint should stand.
But in antitrust, what is "plausible" is far more relative. Twombly
permits a judge to subjectively decide whether she believes a particular
restraint is plausible in a particular industry243 This subjectivity has
already ended countless antitrust class actions. Specifically, two out of
every three antitrust claims filed since Twombly have been dismissed on
237 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond, 95 IOWA
L. REV. BULL. 55, 56-58 (2010).
238 As Senator Arlen Specter noted:
[t]he effect of the Court's actions will no doubt be to deny many plaintiffs with
meritorious claims access to the federal courts and, with it, any legal redress for their
injuries, ... I think that is an especially unwelcome development at a time when, with
the litigating resources of our executive-branch and administrative agencies stretched
thin, the enforcement of federal antitrust, consumer protection, civil rights and other
laws that benefit the public will fall increasingly to private litigants.
Specter Proposes Return to Prior Pleading Standard, BLOG LEGAL TIMES (July 23, 2009, 11:43
AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/07/specter-proposes-return-to-prior-pleading-
standard.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
239 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh,
Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of Milton Handler, and the Uncertain
Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REv. LITIG. 1, 17-27 (2008) (discussing the impact
of Twombly).
240 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565. Curiously, such a determination seems to run counter to the
need for a strict Daubert requirement, given it would result in further excluding economic
testimony, which is often critical to a judge's understanding of an antitrust claim.
241 Cavanagh, supra note 239, at 22.
242 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
243 Further, this requirement ignores that defendants, not plaintiffs, have access to details
needed to pass this barrier. See also Hovenkamp, supra note 237, at 58 (discussing the
problematic nature of Twombly for plaintiffs attempting to plead implicit market division
agreements). As one scholar explains, "[b]ased on differences among judges, one judge may
dismiss a complaint while another concludes that it survives, solely because of the way each
judge applies his or her 'judicial experience and common sense.' This is bound to create
unpredictability, lack of uniformity, and confusion." Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil
Procedural Hurdles in the Quest for Justice, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 624 (2011).
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Rule 12(b)(6) motions, 244 a figure nearly twenty-five percent higher than
in torts or contracts cases. 245 Thus, even assuming antitrust class actions
needed more gatekeeping-a suspect assumption- Twombly more than
sufficed.
Nonetheless, Twombly is far from the only new filter in private
antitrust suits. The Supreme Court just recently added yet another gate
to pursuing antitrust claims. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant,246 the Court provided potential defendants with a powerful
tool to avoid antitrust class actions altogether. A potential defendant
need only include an arbitration clause that precludes class actions to
avoid such suits. 247 With the correct magic language in the terms and
conditions fine print accompanying its products, a potential defendant
can immunize itself from antitrust class actions.248 This new gate is
probably the single most important gatekeeping blow to consumer
antitrust class actions, though its full impact has yet to be felt. Future
antitrust class actions that trigger these arbitration provisions are dead
on arrival. This, too, filters which antitrust claims pass through the
courtroom doors, thus minimizing the need for any further limitations
on such cases.
These new barriers apply to all class actions, not just antitrust
cases. But given the inherent challenges already associated with antitrust
claims, the cumulative effect has been extreme. Some commentators are
wondering whether this is the end of days for private suits.249
Consequently, the need for yet another gatekeeping hurdle is suspect. If
244 Heather Lamberg Kafele & Mario M. Meeks, Developing Trends and Patterns in Federal
Antitrust Cases After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Aschroft v. Iqbal, SHEARMAN &
STERLING LLP ANTITRUST DIG., Apr. 2010. A segment of scholars, practitioners, and advocacy
organizations have sought to ameliorate the harm caused by this decision, though their
proposed responses are far from uniform. Some advocate for limited discovery, others seek a
legislative override of the decision or amendments to the Federal Rules. See Malveaux, supra
note 243, at 629; see also Letter from Albert A. Foer, President, The Am. Antitrust Inst., to Hon.
Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, The Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (May 27, 2010) (endorsing "flashlight discovery" that is limited
initial discovery).
245 Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?,
59 AM. U. L. REv. 553, 607 (2010).
246 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
247 Id. at 2309-10.
248 Id.
249 See, e.g., James Schurz, Commentary, Consumer Class Actions Take Another Hit: Supreme
Court Rules Class-Action Arbitration Waiver Covers Antitrust Claims, 20 WESTLAW J. CLASS
ACTION 2 (2013), available at 2013 WL 3488542; see also David M. Harris, Supreme Court
Continues to Scrutinize Class-Action Practices in Federal Court, 20 WESTLAW J. CLASS ACTION 1
(2013), available at 2013 WL 3488541; Brian Fitzpatrick, Is the End of Class Actions upon Us?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14, 2011, 9:55 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/is-the-end-of-
class-actions-upon-us; Ashby Jones, Is D-Day Approaching for Class Action Lawsuits?, WSJ
BLOG (Nov. 8, 2010, 3:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/11/08/is-d-day-approaching-for-
class-actions-lawsuits.
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anything, adding Daubert to class certification is an overcorrection since
it disproportionately excludes plaintiffs' experts. 250 Blanket pro-
gatekeeping interests alone do not justify the harm caused by adding
Rule 702 to class certification.
B. Adding Daubert to Class Certification Wastes Resources
Like the gatekeeping rationale, the second proffered justification
for early Daubert-saving judicial resources251-suffers from similarly
thin reasoning. As the argument goes, if a case is based on questionable
economist testimony, early exclusion kills the case before the court or
the parties expend unnecessary resources. Of course, this argument
assumes the court rejects the plaintiffs' economist. Thus, this rationale
actually invites judicial overstepping, as Daubert becomes an easy way
to clear complicated antitrust class actions that take years to litigate
from already burdened dockets.252
In actuality, when Rule 702 is properly applied, early Daubert
assessment at class certification raises concerns about misallocating
limited judicial and enforcement resources. Though mentioned before,
it merits repeating that Rule 702 challenges will still be brought
subsequently in the case: pre-trial, during trial, and post-trial. Early
Daubert determinations are just one of many swipes parties take at
expert testimony. This extra swipe comes at a cost. Each repeated expert
challenge exhausts more judicial resources. Allowing these challenges to
occur over and over again quickly adds up, with the cost and delay of
the repeated Daubert motions outweighing any minimal savings from
early exclusions.253
The Daubert Court warned against taking too long and devoting
too many judicial resources to the admissibility inquiry.254 However,
despite this warning, Daubert has evolved into a lengthy process,
250 See Langenfeld & Alexander, supra note 16, at 22.
251 See, e.g., Pecover v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. C 08-2820 VRW, 2010 WL 8742757, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 21, 2010); Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 6:06-cv-00530, 2008 WL
2400944, at *11 (S.D. W. Va. June 11, 2008).
252 See, e.g., In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 863 F. Supp. 2d 966, 998, 1000 (C.D. Cal.
2012) (using Daubert to terminate case on the eve of trial).
253 See N. Dall. Diagnostic Ctr. v. Dewberry, 900 S.W.2d 90, 96 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)
(observing the Daubert and Robinson process "may involve more time and expense in the
litigation process"); Richard H. Middleton, Jr., The Case of Kumho Tire and the Future of
Expert Testimony in Civil Litigation, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 8, 10 (1999) ("Daubert allows
those who want to delay the proceedings to come up with another whole layer of disputes that
have to be resolved .... ").
254 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
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involving a "complex mini-trial."255 Rather than the "quick"
determination originally envisioned, Rule 702 challenges now require
multiday hearings preceded by "the filing of voluminous memoranda in
which the lawyers for both sides try their case on paper."256 This applies
to each expert, so in antitrust cases, where several economic experts
offer testimony, the potential delay is exponential.257 In fact, the
situation has gotten so out of hand that in at least one case, the Daubert
hearing took three times as long as the trial would have taken.258 Courts
are already expressing concern about the delay these motions cause. As
one Delaware court described:
[t]he case currently before the Court is a prime example of how
Daubert hearings could overwhelm. There are over 500 docket
entries, and there are literally boxes of reports, depositions, and
affidavits submitted in support of the parties' respective Motions to
exclude experts. Recently, Plaintiffs' counsel has requested that the
trial date be stayed so that the parties can have Daubert hearings in
the time that is reserved for the trial (for a period of three weeks).
Such a request and similar requests, if granted in every case, could
cripple the trial calendar.259
Given this waste, the burden of expert evaluations now arguably
outweighs the dangers the test originally sought to avoid.260 Why this
waste should be compounded by yet another round of Daubert
challenges is unclear.
255 Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1999). In the
limited cases to date where expert admissibility was evaluated prior to or as part of class
certification, it has already added considerable delay to the certification process. For example,
even in Comcast, where the Daubert question was not squarely at issue, the parties spent
countless attorney hours generating volumes of briefs on expert arguments. The oral argument
alone totaled five days and commenced with the issuance of an eighty-one-page opinion.
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 188 (3d Cir. 2011), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
256 Brief of Margaret A. Berger, Edward J. Imwinkelried, & Stephen A. Salzburg as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20, Kumbo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)
(No. 97-1709), 1998 WL 739321, at *20; see also David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-
Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, 68 Mo. L. REV. 1, 40-41
(2003) (lengthy and confusing Daubert hearings "clog the trial courts today"); Marc T.
Treadwell, Eleventh Circuit Survey-Evidence, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1273, 1279 (2005).
257 Cf Miller, supra note 3, at 313 (describing how Daubert applies to every challenged
expert, making the overall litigation process particularly burdensome for plaintiffs).
258 See United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e are troubled by the
amount of judicial resources that were devoted to the Daubert hearing.").
259 Minner v. Am. Mortgage & Guar. Co., 791 A.2d 826, 845 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000) (footnote
omitted).
260 Treadwell, supra note 256, at 1279 ("[W]hatever benefits have been realized have come at
high costs. District courts spend days, sometimes weeks, on Daubert hearings, and appellate
courts render lengthy and often conflicting decisions trying to define the proper gatekeeping
role for district judges. Consequently, many questions exist as to whether Daubert has been
worth the judicial resources it has cost." (footnote omitted)); see also Crump, supra note 256, at
40-41.
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This exponential delay is particularly problematic in antitrust class
actions since it undermines any notion of preserving resources. Even
without such motions, the timetable from initial investigation to class
certification often takes years. 261 Adding a new stage for expert
challenges will only expand this timetable.262 To clear Daubert, parties
will need to engage in more expansive, more time-consuming expert
discovery to prepare for the battle of the experts. Expert depositions will
take longer, export reports will be lengthier, and class discovery will be
more protracted.263 Since plaintiffs' attorneys' fees are only recovered if
they prevail, unlike the by-the-hour defendants' bar, delay
disproportionately burdens plaintiffs.264
Not only is this delay contrary to conserving judicial resources, it
also seems contrary to legislative intent. The Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA) suggests seeking certification "as early as practicable"-
certainly prior to merits discovery.265 Generally, an expert report can
only be generated after class discovery is complete.266 With earlier
Daubert challenges, a conservative plaintiffs' lawyer might take it one
step further and now wait to seek certification until after all discovery is
complete instead of bifurcating class and merits discovery. That way,
rather than provide a proposed econometric model, the plaintiffs' expert
can run the full methodology using all the facts, thus showing the model
is more than theoretically plausible.267 This could add years to class
certification. 268
261 Part of this delay is due to increased motion to dismiss practice post-Twombly. See Bell
At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). With the increased pleading requirements under
Twombly, antitrust cases are increasingly investigated for months, if not years, before filing. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 237, at 60.
262 See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 508 (E.D.N.Y.
2003) (showing defendant prolonged the case by nearly seven years battling class certification),
affd sub nom. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005); Robert H.
Klonoff, Antitrust Class Actions: Chaos in the Courts, 11 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 20 (2005)
(discussing how Daubert before certification will delay the Rule 23 determination).
263 Treadwell, supra note 260, at 1279.
264 Miller, supra note 3, at 313-14 ("This, like other stop signs, plays into the hands of the
billing-by-the hour regime of the law firms that usually represent corporate and other
economically powerful interests. It has precisely the opposite effect on contingent fee and
public interest lawyers who must bear the increased cost and time investment without any
assurance of reimbursement, let alone compensation."); see also Judge Harvey Brown,
Procedural Issues Under Daubert, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1133, 1177 (1999); Arthur R. Miller,
McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 465, 471 (2012).
265 CAFA shifted the timeline for certification just slightly from "as soon as possible" to "as
early as practicable." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) advisory committee's notes (noting so in
discussion of the 2003 amendments). However, this expansion still assumed certification would
occur prior to merits discovery. Id.
266 See Anthony Z. Roisman, Taming the Daubert Tiger, PRAc. LITIGATOR, May 2009, at 49,
57.
267 Waiting to seek certification means a potential merger of Daubert, class certification, and
summary judgment-a merger which is already on the rise. This makes the consequences of
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Not surprisingly, both the early Daubert hearing and the delay
come with a hefty price tag that does little to preserve resources for the
courts or the litigants. Rather than conserving resources, adding another
Daubert motion requires courts to exhaust extensive resources
reviewing dense filings, evaluating expert reports, and hearing
arguments. The parties also bear a heavy cost with added Daubert
motions, as each hearing involves preparation, transportation, and court
time for the testifying expert. 269 This is in conjunction with the expense
of preparing supporting, supplemental, and rebuttal documents.270 The
information on the cost for completing Daubert determinations is
limited, but given the high hourly rate of economists271 and antitrust
attorneys,272 it easily adds up.
Consequently, these earlier Daubert motions harm antitrust
enforcement without any true gains to judicial efficiency. When Rule
702 is accurately applied pre-certification, a case's time on the docket
increases, as does the costs for both the parties and the judicial system.
Thus conserving judicial resources, the second primary justification for
early Daubert review, lacks merit.
overly rigorous Daubert assessments even more direr, since expert exclusion will invariably
decide both the Rule 23 and Rule 56 motions. See United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234,
1258-59 (10th Cir. 2009); Cortis-Irizarry v. Corporaci6n Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 188
(1st Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, some scholars support merging the procedural steps. See generally
Biesanz & Burt, supra note 84; Linda S. Mullenix, Dropping the Spear: The Case for Enhanced
Summary Judgment Prior to Class Certification, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1197 (2010) (advocating for
summary judgment before class certification).
268 See, e.g., Michael R. Nelson & Mark H. Rosenberg, Behrend, Knowles and the Continuing
Evolution of Class Actions, NELSON LEVINE DE LUCA & HAMILTON CLASS ACTION Q., Spring
2013, available at http://documents.lexology.com/dd7ef57a-67b4-4221-9acb-7eee8baclc4b.pdf#
page=1.
269 Brief of American Association for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees Seeking Affirmance at 26, In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604
(8th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2267), 2010 WL 3761168, at *26.
270 Id.
271 See, e.g., Torday v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 07-372V, 2011 WL
2680717 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 7, 2011) (finding fees between $400-$450 per hour acceptable);
Amended Complaint, Applecon, LLC v. Berry & Leftwich (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-13808),
2006 WL 3885312 (explaining the testifying economist's hourly rate under agreed upon retainer
was $400); see also David Marx, Jr., The "Proper"-and by That I Mean Limited-Role for
Economists in Price-Fixing Litigation, 38 LoY. U. CHI. L. J. 491, 491 (2007) ("[T]he hourly rates
of testifying economists-which I have consistently found to be remarkably similar across the
major economic consulting firms-are even higher than those of the lawyers who retain
them!").
272 In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., No. 99 CIV. 0962(RCC), 2006 WL
3498590, at *10 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2006) (discussing average rates ranging from $350-$595).
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C. Settlement Pressure on Plaintiffs Exceeds the Pressure on Defendants
Finally, the most. prevalent argument for an early Daubert
challenge focuses on settlement pressure. Defendants claim Daubert is
necessary to minimize pressure to settle unmeritorious class claims
certified on the basis of inadmissible evidence.273 Claims that class
actions unduly cause rash settlement began in the 1970s.274 They have
been echoed by class action critics and courts alike.275 Stated simply, a
defendant is likely to avoid gambling and settle even a meritless claim
once it is certified as a class, particularly in the face of treble damages.276
However, in the forty years since these fears first surfaced, the
argument remains primarily anecdotal. Focus on settlement pressure
ignores that aggregate claims do offer the substantial benefit of claim
preclusion in cases where defendants can establish the claim lacks
merit.277 But far more importantly, there is little informed empirical
analysis supporting the fear of in terrorem settlements.278 As a non-
profit think tank recently explained, "[s]ignificantly, the suggestion that
businesses routinely settle 'meritless' class actions with substantial
payments is a myth."279 In fact, the settlement rate for certified class
actions is very close to the settlement rate for other federal lawsuits.280
273 See, e.g., Brief of DRI-The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 10, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (No. 11-864), 2012 WL
3643903, at *10; Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, Allied Educational Foundation,
National Ass'n of Defense Counsel as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Comcast
Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1426 (No. 11-864), 2012 WL 3643902, at *15; see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995);
Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The
Promise of Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 342 (2005).
274 Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on Class
Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 704 (2005).
275 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits,
51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1254-55 (2002); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class Certification Based on Merits
of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (2001) (proposing precertification merits evaluation
through examination of "verdict value"); George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive
Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 545 (1997).
276 See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1882 (2006).
277 See Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 383 (2011).
278 Brief of the American Antitrust Institute & the American Independent Business Alliance
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Comcast Corp., 133 S.Ct. 1426 (No. 11-864); Arthur
R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 103 (2010) ("[C]laims of excessive costs, abuse, and frivolousness in
litigation may have much less substance than many think, and extortionate settlements may be
but another urban legend."); Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1395 n.164 (2003) ("[T]here is little empirical evidence
supporting the theory that frivolous lawsuits are common. . . .").
279 Brief of the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
34, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2013 WL
417719, at *34; see also Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency
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Assuming arguendo that defendants rashly settle antitrust class
claims, it is unclear why early Daubert challenges are the appropriate
salve, particularly given their harm to antitrust enforcement. Early Rule
702 challenges do not necessarily screen out unmeritorious claims.
When properly applied, Rule 702 assesses the admissibility of testimony,
not whether that testimony proves the parties' case. A better screen to
minimize settlement pressure is one that focuses on a case's merits, not
merely evidentiary issues. Instead, as discussed in Part II, misapplication
of Daubert pre-certification creates an impassable wall with little regard
to the claim's merit.
*Even if early Daubert challenges could properly assess a case's
merit prior to class certification, defendants' settlement concerns have
been sufficiently assuaged by the increased gatekeeping previously
discussed.281 In addition, commentators have already noted that the
recently heightened rigor of Rule 23 offsets defendants' alleged
settlement pressures. 282 Thus, there is little need for yet another weapon
against speculative fears of settlement pressures, particularly when that
weapon indiscriminately maims the good claims along with the bad.
Even if concerns with rash settlements were substantiated, these
concerns ignore the very significant pressures early Daubert motions
place on plaintiffs and their potential economists. Plaintiffs' attorneys
are pressured to curtail their enforcement efforts both by not filing
putative claims and settling claims for less than full value. For potential
experts, the pressure to not testify for plaintiffs in these cases is
mounting. Thus, any minimal protection afforded by Daubert is more
than outweighed by the harm these pressures cause to private antitrust
enforcement.
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 103, 159 (2006)
("Meritless filings are not met with payoff money; they are met with motion practice, and
sometimes sanctions." (footnote omitted)); Silver, supra note 278, at 1393; Charles M. Yablon,
The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L.
REv. 65, 70 n.12 (1996) ("In real litigation ... defendants' counsel are generally quite adept at
placing time-consuming and expensive motions and other obstacles in the path of plaintiffs'
counsel... such that it seems unlikely a plaintiff can create a sufficient threat, based on
disparity in litigation costs alone, to coerce a settlement.").
280 Kanner & Nagy, supra note 274, at 697.
281 See supra Part III.A and accompanying notes (discussing increased judicial gatekeeping
in antitrust class actions).
282 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, New Limits on Class Actions, TRIAL, Nov. 2011, at 54, 56;
Timothy D. Edwards, Class Action Suits After Walmart v. Dukes, Wis. LAW., Nov. 2011, at 18,
20; Ian Simmons, Alexander P. Okuliar & Nilam A. Sanghvi, Without Presumptions: Rigorous
Analysis in Class Certification Proceedings, ANTITRUST, Summer 2007, at 61, 66; Jessie J.
Holland, Court Turns Away Class Action Against Comcast, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 27, 2013,
2:02 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/court-turns-away-class-action-against-comcast.
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First, adding Daubert as a precursor to certification pressures
plaintiffs' attorneys to forego filing claims.283 Without attorneys willing
to pursue antitrust cases, anticompetitive conduct will likely go
unredressed.284 Thus, rather than minimizing defendants' pressure to
settle, adding additional Daubert motions just deters bringing cases in
the first place. This in turn triggers right of access concerns, as these
early expert challenges conflict with plaintiffs' right to a "just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."285
When a claim actually gets filed, plaintiffs have little ability to ward off
the disproportionate exclusion of their economists. Given the great
discretion courts have in completing Daubert,286 plaintiffs are left
attempting to read the tea leaves from prior decisions to arm their
experts against attack.287
Attorneys are already more hesitant to accept these cases. Due to
the rising costs of expert testimony, small- and medium-value claims
have become financially unviable.288 Many private antitrust firms are
also involved in securities and consumer class actions and have chosen
to emphasize these other aspects of their litigation portfolio.289 While
these other practice areas have also been affected by stricter Rule 23
standards, Daubert is not necessarily as high of a hurdle in these practice
areas where the damages models are often less complex. Rather than
invest limited resources in an uncertain terrain, the safer course is to
diversify the risk by filing other types of cases. Without private antitrust
enforcement, the wrongdoing will likely go unpunished, as competitor
and government claims are rare. 290
For those class action attorneys willing to take a risk, the pressure
still remains to file only those few antitrust cases where the Daubert
fence seems particularly climbable. Given the importance of economic
283 See Adrogu6 and Baker, supra note 167, at 13.
284 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
285 FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
286 See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes (discussing judicial discretion in applying
Rule 702).
287 Pierce & DeTeso, supra note 139 at 170 ("To the consternation of trial attorneys, there is
no way to select a 'Daubert-proof' expert or to fully prepare for a Daubert hearing because a
trial judge is not required to consider any particular reliability factors.").
288 Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking
Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REv. 257, 267 (2005); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Preemption's Rise (and Bit of
a Fall) as Products Liability Reform: Wyeth, Riegel, Altria, and the Restatement (Third)s
Prescription Product Design Defect Standard, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 727, 756 (2009).
289 See David B. Wilkin, Frank ]. Kelley Institute of Ethics Lecture Series: Rethinking the
Public-Private Distinction in Legal Ethics: The Case of "Substitute Attorneys General", MICH. ST.
L. REv. 423, 446-47 (2010) (outlining how firms, such as Cohen Milstein, handle class actions
in various areas, including securities fraud).
290 See supra Introduction and accompanying notes (explaining the limited role competitor
and government suits play in U.S. antitrust enforcement efforts).
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modeling to class certification, and the accompanying dangers
associated with not surviving this test, antitrust plaintiffs' attorneys
would be wary to rely on any model that might not be admissible.291 A
narrow definition of reliable economic testimony limits antitrust
enforcement efforts to cases with easy modeling.292 If the market
definition or damages are complicated, plaintiffs' attorneys will feel
great pressure to decline the case because this complexity increases the
chance an expert's testimony will be excluded under an early Daubert
motion. Thus, procedural fences like Daubert limit the ability of
antitrust cases to push for more expansive enforcement.293
Requiring a Daubert test at class certification also pressures
plaintiffs to settle early. Even if a case survives an early expert
evaluation, the case continues with the specter of future Daubert
motions still lingering.294 If the case does not survive Daubert, plaintiffs'
only option for enforcement and potential compensation is
settlement.295 Given settlements are generally still approved without
Daubert scrutiny,296 Daubert shifts the pressure to settle from
defendants to plaintiffs. As risk increases, so do early settlements.297 This
291 For example, some scholars argue that some of these newer models are less likely to
satisfy Daubert. See, e.g., Malcom B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Economics
Survive Daubert?, 34 AKRON L. REV. 795, 795 (2001) (arguing post-Chicago models face
significant Daubert problems because they are less likely to be matched to the facts of the case.).
292 The risk also encourages antitrust plaintiffs to focus solely on economic goals foregoing
other potential, non-economic goals. Some of these other goals include dispersion of economic
power, protecting small business, and the promotion of equal opportunities. United States v.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1948); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues
at the Intersection ofAntitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 914 n.2 (2001);
Stephen F. Ross, Network Effects and the Limits of GTE Sylvania's Efficiency Analysis, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 945, 947 (2001).
293 Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDozO L. REV. 367, 383-84
(2009). For example, when Professor Areeda argued successfully that oligopolistic disciplinary
pricing was an accepted theory under the Robinson-Patman Act, the testimony was later
excluded for lack of analytical fit. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
509 U.S. 209, 242-43 (1993); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Antitrust Economics-Making Progress,
Avoiding Regression, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 163, 171-72 (2003).
294 See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94C897, 1999 WL
33889 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 1999) (denying defendants' pretrial requests to exclude the testimony of
plaintiffs' economic expert, but subsequently excluding the testimony on defendants' motion
for summary judgment at the close of plaintiffs' case), affd in part and vacated in part, 186 F.3d
781 (7th Cir. 1999).
295 Miller, supra note 264, at 471-72.
296 Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 636 (6th Cir. 2007); Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. v. ACE INA Holdings,
Inc., No. 07 CV 2898, 2012 WL 651727, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2012), appeal dismissed, 710
F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence and the requirements of Daubert
and its progeny do not apply at a fairness hearing .....
297 Coffee, supra note 22, at 231.
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is not properly attributed to attorney greed,298 but rather to problems of
valuing cases with so much uncertainty of success. 299
Early Daubert motions also exert pressure on economists.
Generally, economists are already less likely to testify than other
scientific experts because the harshness of cross-examination is more
intense than it would be for academic economic research, where there is
less of a tradition of research replication than in other disciplines.300
Daubert just exacerbates economists' real pressure to avoid testifying for
plaintiffs. Exclusion has a significant impact on testifying economists.
Many economists who have felt the sting of overaggressive Daubert
determinations are highly respected law and economics scholars.301
Economists must weigh the significant financial and professional
consequences of exclusion before testifying. On the financial side, it is
far less likely that a previously excluded expert will be retained in future
cases. On the professional side, exclusion undermines the expert's
alleged "expertise" in his field. As two scholars note, "[o]ne can only
imagine the feeling of being among the economists whose analyses,
rightly or wrongly, are now staple fare for textbook chapters on 'quality
control' for expert testimony." 302 This fear may have a particularly
strong chilling effect on professors. As Judge Posner explains,
"[pirofessors may incur heavy nonpecuniary costs in diminished
academic reputation (something they greatly value, or else they
probably would not be in academia) if they are shown to be careless or
dishonest witnesses."30
Adding earlier Daubert motions pressures economists to consider
career paths where the risks of exclusion are not so marked, such as
testifying for defendants, sticking to their day jobs, or testifying in other
areas of law. Any of these alternatives leave plaintiffs' attorneys in the
same place: with a smaller pool of viable economists to provide the
298 Some critics quickly point to greed without sufficient consideration of other motives. See,
e.g., id. at 256-57 (arguing settlements are a result of a conflict of interest forcing attorneys to
take whatever they can get and run).
299 Pierce & DeTeso, supra note 139, at 170 ("Moreover, assessing the appropriateness of
settlement is more difficult for a trial attorney who cannot predict whether his or her expert
will be permitted to testify.").
300 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477,
1537-38 (1999).
301 For example, George Priest, Robert Hall, Richard Gilbert, and Franklin Fisher were all
excluded when testifying for plaintiffs. See Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d
1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) (Fisher); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039,
1046-47 (8th Cir. 2000) (Hall); In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., No. CIV.A. RDB-10-
0318, 2013 WL 1855980, at *2 (D. Md. May 1, 2013) (Priest); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v.
Rambus Inc., No. CV-00-20905 RMW, 2008 WL 73689, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2008)
(Gilbert).
302 Solow & Fletcher, supra note 32, at 490.
303 Posner, supra note 300, at 1537.
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testimony so essential to certification and, later, to proving liability and
damages.
Combined, the pressures facing plaintiffs by adding Daubert to
antitrust class certification decisions more than offset any lingering
defendant settlement pressure. Thus, defendants' theoretical settlement
pressure does not sufficiently justify early Daubert motions, leaving
proponents of pre-certification expert evaluation with no justifiable
basis for adding this new hurdle to private antitrust enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Daubert will undoubtedly continue to play a large role in private
antitrust cases. Economic testimony is the lynchpin in these cases, so
parties are highly motivated to exclude opposing expert testimony.
Unfortunately, though, the standards for evaluating such testimony are
in turmoil, making it questionable whether such arguments can be
properly resolved by the courts. Lack of guidance on how to evaluate
economist testimony invites judicial overstepping, denying Daubert
from serving its proper, more limited function.
Even more doubtful is the need for resolving such disputes earlier
in the litigation, particularly prior to class certification. The Supreme
Court majority remains hell-bent on disfavoring class actions. To that
end, the Court continues to add judicial barriers to these cases, without
recognizing that not all class actions are the same and many are
essential. Given the recent addition of more hurdles to private
enforcement, the need for such evaluation as a mechanism to somehow
even the playing field for defendants is questionable at best. This is
particularly true given the chilling effect such a requirement could have
on antitrust enforcement and the lack of true justification for this new
hurdle.
Consequently, the best practice is to hold off on Daubert
evaluations, reserving them for later in the case, when the concerns
about protecting jurors are no longer hypothetical. Otherwise, Daubert
could hasten the end of antitrust class actions. Death by Daubert would
be a tragic ending for such an essential part of antitrust enforcement.
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